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Videnov Addresses Assembly on Cabinet Goals

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[Speech by Bulgarian Prime Minister-designate Zhan Videnov on new cabinet's intentions, at 25 January session of National Assembly—live]

[Text] Esteemed members of the National Assembly: I would like to present to you and to Bulgarian society the intentions of the Democratic Left cabinet, and outline the political and economic foundation from which we will act in order to ensure continuity in the activity of the government.

The countries of East and Central Europe are in a state of transition. Each country that has embarked upon this road is doing this under its own circumstances, at a different time, and with a different economic and political potential. Bulgaria occupies a worthy place among those countries, although it is experiencing even greater difficulties than those specific to this transition. Our difficulties are related to our specific geopolitical realities.

I would like to especially point out that, five years after the beginning of the reforms, we have succeeded in laying the foundation of modern democracy in a peaceful and civilized manner. If a functioning division of powers is an indisputable achievement of democracy, then I must stress that some of the most unpleasant consequences of the policy of restoration, crude ideological approach, and lack of professionalism in the executive power in the period 1991-92 were the destruction of the Bulgarian national character, the weakening of the national institutions, and the appearance of organized crime. The national dignity and culture of the Bulgarians suffered grave blows.

The first goal for us Bulgarians is to find a way to eliminate the economic crisis and ensure social conditions that correspond to our traditions, culture, life, and dignity as a nation, as well as to the changing world.

The coalition government of the Democratic Left—the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS] and the Ecoglasnost Political Club—assumes responsibility for Bulgaria's development at an especially grave moment. I would like to assure you that we fully understand the realities and difficulties we will be facing. We do not promise a painless and rapid restoration of Bulgaria's ruined statehood [srinatata durzhavnost] and economy. However, we will invest our entire professionalism, political will, and personal dignity in justifying the electorate's confidence in the Democratic Left.

The facts are grave. I will refrain from assessments, and would rather use the language of figures. The Gross National Product in 1994 declined 44 percent in comparison to 1989. Industrial production dropped almost 50 percent. Agricultural production decreased more than 35 percent. The retail trade turnover decreased by more than 64 percent. Our exports were halved.

Great damage was inflicted by the model of land restitution imposed by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the activity of the liquidation councils in agriculture. What had been created over decades has been destroyed within a few years. Not even after the war was our agriculture in such a pitiful situation. As a result of the growing economic crisis, the population's per capita real income decreased 57 percent and pensions declined even more. Now, more than 85 percent of Bulgarians are living below the social minimum level.

Acquiring housing became a very difficult task. The price of one square meter of housing space is beyond the possibilities of most Bulgarian families. Investment activity has been practically blocked. The decrease in production caused the loss of 1.4 million jobs. At the end of 1944, there were more than 500,000 unemployed.

As a result of the total economic ruin, education, science, culture, and health protection are also in a pitiful situation. Elderly, sick, and disabled people are left to their fates. Crime has reached the proportions of a national disaster, while the justice system has greatly decreased its efficiency. Many regions and municipalities find themselves in a disastrous economic, social, and ecological situation. The situation in regions with mixed populations is especially alarming. The water-supply crisis really endangers the lives and health of those who live in Sofia and many other places.

The task of the new government is incredibly complex. The country is engulfed in a comprehensive crisis. Many problems require an immediate reaction. At the same time, the working out of a responsible and realistic solution is impossible without serious analysis and broad consultations. Therefore, the cabinet will specify its intentions in four related documents: This program declaration expresses the scope of the policy we intend to conduct, and the first steps relate to the most acute and urgent problems, about which we made specific commitments to our voters.

The second document is the 1995 budget. We aim to facilitate the adoption of this budget by the National Assembly with the largest possible support by no later than the end of March.

The program for governing the country in the upcoming four years will be presented at the end of the first 100 days of our government, together with the appropriate legislative program. A White Paper entitled "Objective Analysis of the Situation in the Country" will clarify the situation of the society and economy that we find at the beginning of our tenure, without sparing the truth but also without exaggerated assessments.

Ladies and Gentlemen, representatives of the people: The government sets itself three main goals in the economic and social policy until 1998: First, we must

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turn the revival of production revival into lasting economic growth with increased employment of labor. Second, we must tame inflation and create the conditions for gradually increasing real income. The third is curbing economic crime and establishing clear economic rules.

For the four years of the 37th National Assembly's mandate, the main goal can be specified in the following basic goals related to eliminating the crisis and accelerating the upsurge: laying the foundations of a social market economy through the regulating of economic mechanisms; creating macroeconomic foundations for a stable growth with improved structural characteristics of the Gross National Product; stabilizing the financial sector, restoring confidence in the leva, and taming inflation; discovering new jobs and gradually limiting unemployment; attaining domestic and foreign economic equilibrium and improving the country's balance of payments; integrating the Bulgarian economy into the united European market and restoring foreign economic relations with our traditional partners; not allowing the drastic impoverishment of entire social groups, and gradually increasing the real income of the majority of the population; increasing care for regions and settlements that are in a disastrous economic, social, demographic, and ecological situation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, People's Representatives: The country's resources and alternatives for the next one to two years are extremely limited. This requires realism in programming the socioeconomic indices and goals that comprise the following urgent anticrisis program for the period until 1996:

We must ensure that the Gross National Product grows in 1995 by 1.5 percent, and in 1996 by 2.5-3 percent. We will rapidly increase the share of the private sector on the basis of an active cash and voucher privatization. We will accelerate and generally complete the restoration of ownership of the land and ensure a stable growth in agrarian production. We will limit the budget and stop the avalanche-like growth of the national debt. We will apply more efficient social and compensation mechanisms related to providing guarantees to the people with the lowest incomes. We will conduct a moderate protectionism in keeping with the national priorities in industrial policy and the international agreements we have signed.

Our government's economic policy will essentially be based on the regulated market. This requires a greater engagement of the state in economic life, and implementing the reform, gradually eliminating restrictions and stimulating growth in accordance with the structural policy. To implement this policy, we propose the establishment of a Ministry of Economic Development that will do economic prognosis and programming, coordinate the activity of the branch ministries, and regulate the macroeconomic parameters and balances.

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen, the government of the Democratic Left will direct its efforts in the following directions:

First, restoring production. The government will encourage the stabilization and revival of production. It will actively use the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development for financing projects that guarantee improved quality, increased competitive ability, efficient utilization of the national resources, and new technologies. Within the shortest period of time, we will complete mutual relations between the state and the enterprises that spring from the Law on Settling Bad Credits Allocated Up To 31 December 1990. Thus, the government will allow enterprises to activate the organization of their recovery programs.

The application of the state orders system will undoubtedly have a positive effect on companies. The analysis of the production structures will allow us to identify promising companies and activities that require recovery measures that will prevent the hasty liquidation of production capacities. We will undertake urgent actions aimed at stopping the decapitalization of state and municipal sectors and stopping the leaking of capital from state companies.

The grave situation of the state sector in the economy imposes the need to introduce clear rules for managing it, and stabilizing the status of the leaders of state enterprises. We envisage adopting appropriate stimuli for small and medium-sized businesses. We will encourage the practice of traditional professions and domestic economic activity.

With the transition to a regulated market transition and by improving the general economic conditions in the country, we will significantly decrease the business risk for both domestic and foreign investors. We shall simplify the procedures related to attracting foreign investments and creating mixed companies in Bulgaria. It is necessary to strengthen the state guarantees for property that has been acquired by foreign investors.

The development of an infrastructure of regional, national, and international importance is a precondition for increasing the investment activity and stabilizing the pace of growth. This applies both to repairing the existing basic road and railway system and to building and developing the North-South and East-West highways, the bridges across the Danube, the oil and gas pipelines, the energy system—which is especially important—telecommunications, the ports, and the postal services.

Second: developing structural reform and industrial privatization. The cabinet's plan to accelerate privatization is one of the basic priorities in its economic program. After years of senseless ideologization, even our political opponents admitted the economic need to broadly apply the mechanisms of social privatization through vouchers. Today, we face the dilemma of either

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effecting a rapid mass privatization or conducting a gradual change in property ownership that will continue for decades. The grave situation of the industrial sector, which affects even more painfully the banking system and the state finances, does not allow any delay. The government will renew and accelerate the preparation and implementation of voucher privatization. It is necessary to complete the preparatory process, adopt the relevant laws and programs, and activate the mechanisms of mass privatization within a brief period of time—by midyear. We will do this on the basis of privatization deals such as managers' contracts, leasing contracts with an option to buy, and the participation of labor collectives in privatization with better payment conditions.

The broader use of securities for payment of debts in leva and foreign currencies are a specific reserve in privatization. However, in this sphere, our national interests must be protected to the necessary degree.

Third: accelerating the reform in agriculture and providing state protection for agrarian producers. The goals of our policy in agriculture are: Stopping the waste; creating and introducing a beneficial economic environment for the establishment and development of vital agrarian farms; ensuring conditions for the production of the agricultural produce needed by the country; and ensuring a reasonable level of income to agricultural producers.

We see the rapid completion and end of the activity of the liquidation councils as a prerequisite for stopping the ruin of our agriculture. We will demand responsibility from those members of the councils who have committed crimes and inflicted damage on proprietors. The distribution of property will be completed by the proprietors themselves. We will accelerate and generally complete the restoration of land property and ensure guarantees against land fragmentation. We will ensure conditions of free choice and equality of production forms: cooperatives, associations, and private and family farms. The government will cooperate in facilitating the activity of trade, financial, and other organizations that could assist agricultural producers.

We will ensure conditions for comprehensive participation by agricultural producers in the privatization of food industry enterprises and related activities. We will improve state organizations in the sphere of seed production, veterinary medicine, and agrochemical, meliorative, and other servicing sectors.

The state will protect agricultural producers by providing purposeful financing, customs alleviations, and protected purchasing prices for especially important agricultural products. A special national fund, which will be established through a special law, will be the financial foundation of this protection.

We will approach the issue of resolving the problem of Bulgarian forests with a special responsibility. They are an exceptional ecological, social, and economic asset of national and global importance. The problem lies not in changing the ownership of the forests, but in providing the legal guarantees and control related to protecting this national resource.

The government will direct its efforts toward preparing and implementing a national environmental protection strategy. Its basic goals will be related to developing and improving the system of regulating mechanisms for managing the environment and the national system of ecological monitors; integration with European ecological policy; providing the public with ecological information, and attracting social and public organization to implementing the environmental protection policy. We will give priority to issues related to activities such as the water supply, curbing the waste of water in major cities such as Sofia, and implementing many local projects related to supplying water.

Fourth: activating foreign economic activity and building the market structures in our country. One of the most important tasks of our government is to restore and expand the positions of Bulgarian producers and merchants in the international markets. The development of the country's export potential is possible only through the adoption of a comprehensive strategy the basic element of which must be a system of measures aimed at encouraging exportation. This system must conform to the logic of the economic reform and be coordinated with the internationally accepted norms for regulating trade within GATT. Maintaining the pace and expanding trade relations with the Balkan states must be combined with expanding market positions in Western countries and developing integration projects with the European community and the countries of the European Union [EU].

Another element of our export-increasing strategy will be establishing beneficial conditions in our traditional export markets in Russia and other CIS countries, East Europe, the Middle East, and the developed countries with which we still have agreements and which have debts to Bulgaria for goods supplied in the past. We support continuing active relations with international financial and economic institutions.

Equal membership in the European community and joining the World Trade Organization, the organization that will replace COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] in establishing a new export-control regime and other international structures without which it will be impossible to develop our foreign trade relations and economy as a whole, will undoubtedly be a basic priority in our policy.

It is necessary to work out a clear state policy on the foreign debt. Servicing the debt deal will be possible only through a strategy of increasing the competitive ability of our national production and stimulating export.

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In the sphere of domestic trade, we will direct our attention to constructing and developing market structures and regulating the restoration of the basic rules and principles of conducting trade.

Restoring the domestic market balance will be achieved through the mechanisms of the foreign trade regime. This will include differential duties on the import of strategic raw materials and equipment of special importance for the population, protective duties for the production of the products of the processing industry, strict control over the quality of imported goods, and ensuring reliable protection of consumer rights.

We will stimulate building market relations and relations, stock markets, and maximally improving relations among all participants in the channels through which the goods move from the producers to the consumers. We will curb speculation by regulating and differentiating trade margins.

Fifth: We will take action with a view to the recovery of the banking system and stabilizing the budget.

The stability of the banking system is a decisive condition for the success of the comprehensive economic policy. This presupposes a better coordination between the government and the Bulgarian National Bank. We will adopt measures aimed at stopping the decapitalization of state trade banks and their stabilization, including via the privatization of banks. We will apply decisive measures aimed against the accumulation of new bad debts. We will guarantee that banking control turns into a strong, efficient, and incorruptible institution.

The government is aware of the limited possibilities it has in the budget sphere. The positive effect of the economic revival and growth as a result of structural reforms will be felt not earlier than the beginning of 1996. Therefore, during the current year, we will stress a more rational use of scarce financial resources, and concentrate our attention only on the most painful of the numerous acute problems we have. We aim to make the budget implement both purely fiscal and stimulating functions. A budget policy that does not combine those two functions is unreliable and destructive for the real economy.

We will improve the tax system with a view to increasing the collection of taxes. We will regulate the local finances through legislation. We will introduce an accelerated restoration of the tax credit for the export value-added tax.

The 1995 budget will be prepared as soon as possible on the basis of the existing tax laws. The government program will outline the directions for implementing tax reform until 1998. By adopting new tax laws and amending existing ones, we will strengthen the stimulating role of taxes—in developing separate productions, regions, and activities; building works of housing infrastructure; and financing education, health protection, science, culture, and sports.

Sixth: regulating prices, income, and employment, and curbing inflation. For the purpose of stabilizing prices, we will accelerate the establishment of a capital and monetary market. This will include the introduction of long-range state securities, basic funds, real property, and land. We will strengthen control over price-forming in the basic commodity groups, and sanctions against violators.

The government will implement a new income policy that allows an economic growth at a tolerable social price and a more just distribution of the difficulties of the transition among the various social groups.

In our governmental program until 1998, we will propose coordinated changes in all taxes and social security payments with a view to achieving a better combination of economic efficiency and social justice.

The system of income indexation and compensation will be changed in order to overcome the existing automatic and proportional attitude and achieve a better protection of the minimum income. For all social compensations paid by the state and municipal budgets, we will set special income levels determined on the basis of the number of family members.

The government aims to change the employment policy. We will adopt a complex program for waging a struggle against unemployment and related programs for regions that are in a disastrous situation, and for improving the employment of separate social groups: young people, graduates of educational establishments, Army veterans, the disabled, and so forth.

We will reduce the influx of foreign workers into Bulgaria to the minimum possible. We will strengthen social control on the implementation of labor and social security legislation, and will prosecute strictly forms of illegal employment, work under health-damaging conditions, and cases of a lack of social security for the workers, as well as discrimination in wages.

Seventh: strengthening cooperation among the social partners and reforming the social sphere. The government understands that the efforts of all Bulgarian citizens, social groups, and public and state institutions are needed, to eliminate the crisis and implement economic reform. Social partnership on the crucial issues of economic development is necessary. During 1995, we will create normative organizational and other conditions aimed at forming the institution of social partnership, which will include the relevant structures at the national, branch, territorial, and company levels.

On the basis of talks with our partners, we intend to introduce changes in the statute of the National Council on Tripartite Cooperation, through which many specific issues will be resolved. This includes the conduct of trade

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union elections, and ensuring representation of the workers and a more precise definition of the rights and duties of the government representatives. In order to resolve the acute social problems, we will attract other social groups to negotiations on issues that directly affect their interests.

The government will include in its priorities social legislation and reforms in the social sphere. Social funds will be established. They will be judicially independent and will function on the basis of the principle of self-financing and partial subsidizing by the budget.

The government will regulate and encourage market competition in the insurance services sector.

The reform in the social sphere will be conducted in an especially intensive manner, taking all factors into consideration and conducting a constant dialogue with the social partners.

The government will take the necessary steps to have the health system function and to guarantee free health protection. We will make efforts to change the system of remunerating health workers. Private medical practice and its relations with the public health protection will be regulated through laws. State control over the price of medicines will be introduced. The medical activities will be aimed at reaching the stage of being based on the insurance principle of financing. The health protection system will be gradually directed toward a separation from the state budget.

Eighth: guaranteeing accessible education and child care and developing Bulgarian science.

The government took on the commitment to work out a national strategy on protecting and developing education, science, and technology. The state strategy on economic growth will specify the priorities in science. We will work out a program to restore and develop the scientific branches. We will develop funds and projects of fundamental financing. We will support the tendency to decrease the relative share of budget means in education and science.

Until the end of 1996, we will work out state educational requirements with a view to adopting them. We will adopt urgent legislative measures related to the statute of the establishments of higher education and to amending the uniform educational norms.

We will eliminate the antiscientific criteria introduced through the repressive Panev law. We will ensure that education is accessible to all and guaranteed through cost-free studies, expanding the number of students and providing state financial assistance for the socially underprivileged.

We will propose a system of providing credits for students.

The government intends to seek a broad public consensus on the most painful problems of the youth, and will work to create and implement a youth social policy that will provide every young person with a chance to develop his abilities, and create broad possibilities for talented and enterprising young people.

We will work to protect children and the young generation from crime, drugs, sects, prostitution, xenophobia, violence, and racism, and to guarantee their rights in schools and establishments of higher education, during service in the Army, in the family, and in implementing their work relations.

In support of our youth policy, we will attract nongovernmental organizations and private business.

We will protect and develop the infrastructure that guarantees the foundation for young peoples activities and creativity during leisure time, as well as arts, sports, tourism, and youth foreign exchanges.

Ninth: protection for Bulgarian culture. The government will follow a national policy on culture under which the state will not shirk its responsibilities but will also seek a maximum contribution from private initiative. The government will increase the share of the national budget allocated to public culture. It will grant greater powers to the local authorities to foster cultural activities, and will increase their responsibilities for the standard of cultural life at the local level. It will devote more funds to financial assistance for publishing Bulgarian books and classic works in foreign languages. It will expand the possibilities for extrabudgetary funding in the cultural sphere. It will ensure the optimal utilization of cultural facilities, in active coordination with the creative associations and unions. It will immediately introduce a moratorium on the application of the property restitution act in relation to buildings, monuments, and other items of value—of national cultural or historical importance.

The government will organize effective control to prevent the lax application of the copyright law and nonpayment of taxes on cultural products. In broad consultation with the institutions concerned, the government will introduce protective quotas for Bulgarian artistic and cultural works from the nation's inheritance.

Tenth: the integration of Bulgaria into Europe and a worthy foreign policy. Our principal foreign policy aims will be to ensure our national security and economic interests and to consolidate the democratic processes. The orientation of Bulgaria toward Europe is a main priority for us, and we will strive to accelerate Bulgaria's integration into the relevant European structures—political, economic, military, and cultural.

The government will strive to stimulate bilateral relations with the principal European states, all the member-countries of the EU, and the countries associated with the EU. We would like to activate a permanent dialogue and cooperation with the United States—in the political, military, and especially economic fields. The cabinet will

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make strenuous efforts to restore and develop the most active of relations with Russia and the other CIS states.

We will continue Bulgaria's commitment to the Partnership for Peace initiative and our closer association with the existing Euro-Atlantic security systems, in parallel with the process of transforming them into systems of collective security with the constructive participation of all European states.

The government will advocate a policy of stabilization in the Balkans based on the following principles: renunciation of territorial claims, inviolability of borders, respect of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and placing relations with all neighboring countries on an equal basis.

Attempts to form axes, blocs, or spheres of influence would set the Balkan states in confrontation with one another. We will seek new integrational forms for all-Balkan cooperation; we will act to further initiatives aimed at eliminating the military imbalances in the region.

We will not permit any deviation from the principle of Bulgaria's nonparticipation in any form whatsoever—direct or indirect, including under the aegis of international organizations—in military actions in the Balkans. We will not make our territory available for assisting such operations. We regard the gradual lifting of the Yugo-embargo as an urgent political and economic necessity, and will use all possibilities and come out with new initiatives to alleviate the country's economic difficulties and losses from the sanctions imposed by the United Nations against Yugoslavia and other countries.

Eleventh: guaranteeing national security. The main risks to Bulgaria's security today are: regional instability; the weapons imbalances in the Balkans; the lack of a control mechanism on the territory of the former Yugoslavia; ethnoreligious conflicts; waves of immigrants; the severe economic crisis and level of crime in the country; and the deliberate policy of rendering the army, the police, and the intelligence and counterintelligence organs powerless.

The government's main efforts to neutralize these risks will be directed toward incorporating Bulgaria into the new European security structure, and will not affect the lawful interests of any nation. We will work to strengthen the internal security structures and to overcome the situation of politicization and cadre purges in the law-enforcement ministries. We will take effective measures to restore and strengthen the intelligence and counterintelligence organs.

It is necessary to bring the organizational structure, the equipping, the armament, and the training of the Armed Forces into line with their strategic and operational tasks, developments in the art of warfare, the assessment of the specific risks to our national security, and the criteria of adequate defense.

Twelfth: strengthening law and order within the country, and the fight against crime. The state is obliged to guarantee the inviolability of the individual and the citizenry's lives, liberty, and property. We have set ourselves the goal of turning Bulgaria into a rule-of-law state in which the supremacy of the law is a generally accepted priority of society, and to proceed toward this goal with the clear realization that the state has a duty to the ordinary citizen.

Our government is taking over a grave legacy. A wave of unprecedented crime has engulfed the country for more than three years now. Crime has reached its highest level since the beginning of the century. Every year, almost 250,000 crimes are recorded, while serious crimes, robberies, and murders are increasing at the rate of 10 percent per year. These alarming changes are accompanied by a sharp decrease in effective action against them by the crime-control and law-and-order system. Almost all the control organs have been eliminated. The structure of the Interior Ministry has been shattered. The judicial system has been bled dry. The results of all this are more than evident. The crime clear-up rate barely exceeds 35 percent, and the huge number of undetected and unpunished crimes rises constantly.

We have firmly decided to launch an immediate attack on crime, to stop the spread of organized crime, and to detect cases of corruption. We have decided to put a stop to violence in the streets, and to restore tranquillity for our citizens. However, it is impossible to get results from the crime-fighting policy unless the legislature, executive, judiciary, mass media, and the public at large commit themselves to unified efforts in this direction. We envisage substantially improving the organization and cooperation between specialized crime-fighting organs.

Alongside improvements to the system for counteracting crime, we will also make adequate changes in penal legislation. We will formulate the general principles, categories of crimes, appropriate forms of punishment for each crime, procedures for imposing various forms of punishment, and adequate means for serving jail sentences.

We will make changes to the Code of Penal Procedure so as to provide enhanced guarantees for the preliminary detention of suspected perpetrators of serious premeditated crimes and to prevent the release on bail of persons charged with murder, rape, and robbery, defendants in certain pending cases, and habitual criminals. We will act to ensure that preliminary investigations are concluded within the deadlines prescribed by the law, and accelerate court procedures by removing the possibilities for repeatedly adjourning cases without good grounds.

We will speed up the hearing of cases that do not present any complications in law or in fact. We will improve cooperation between the police and investigative organs.

We envisage changes in the penal code: introducing special penal articles to cover tax evasion, serious cases

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of extortion, abuse of monopoly positions, unfair competition, fictitious bankruptcies, large-scale foreign-exchange violations, and other new forms of criminal activity.

The government crime-fighting program will be further developed and defined. The Interior Ministry organs will be provided with the necessary personnel and material equipment and facilities. The Interior Ministry and the other government departments concerned will continue their active international cooperation with the international organizations and specialized crime-fighting organizations of other countries.

Thirteenth: development of the reform in the legal system, and strengthening state government. The government faces the task of implementing the principles proclaimed in the Constitution as regards developing our democratic statehood and institutions of power. We regard our country's evolution into a rule-of-law state as particularly important. We will draft and propose that the laws envisaged in the Constitution be adopted as a matter of priority, and will impart an impetus to the development of the legal reform. In this context, we will enhance the role of the Legislative Council under the Council of Ministers and improve cooperation in proposing, drafting, and adopting legal acts.

The government will become the main generator of ideas and draft documents for developing our body of laws. In addition to this, the government will do whatever is necessary to further improve the activity of the organs of the judiciary. We will prepare the normative and organizational implementation of a three-tiered judicial system. We will seek ways to accelerate and further improve the work of guard and protection services, including the courts and prisons. We will also create the necessary prerequisite conditions for the reliable functioning of the judiciary, and will ensure suitable conditions for the work of magistrates, making improvements in organization and cooperation between the individual units.

We will adopt the necessary normative and organizational measures to create and strengthen the control system and develo the state administration. We will create a state control system that will guarantee full-fledged finan tax, and banking control, as well as control over p s, privatization deals, and the standards of various goods and services.

We will propose a law on the Chamber of Accounts that will include the establishment of its own special judicial organ, which will allow it to note and sanction illegal expenditures in the state budget.

We aare striving for an open and honest government that does not allow an abuse of power and that limits the possibilities of corruption. In order to attain this goal, we will establish rules of incompatibility aimed at preventing a concentration of functions related to the economic management of state property and administrative operations in the hands of the same state employees. We will propose requirements under which ministers, the president, deputies, and other officials must declare their income and property. We will introduce draft laws on commissioning state orders, granting concessions, and guiding state participation in economic activity, and on the status of state employees. We will strengthen the state institutions consistently.

With its operational and legislative activity the government will guarantee the democratization and further development and strengthening of local self-government. The transfer of activities to the municipalities will be done simultaneously with the transfer of the relevant financial, material, and cadre resources. There is a very acute need to bring the municipal budget revenue sources into accord with the obligations of the municipalities that have been determined by the Constitution and the law, while ensuring the right of the municipal councils to independently utilize their subsidies and their own municipal revenues.

The work related to issues of local self-management and the administrative-territorial reform is a matter of priority for the government. We will guarantee the holding of regular municipal elections in accordance with the law.

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen: The government of the Democratic Left intends to conduct a consistent policy of national consensus. This is not an abstract concept, but a real challenge. On the basis of dialogue and the balancing of interests, we must reach agreement on the directions and phases of the economic reform, and on the social cost that is both necessary and tolerable by broad strata of the society. We must assert the tactic of the superiority of the law. The citizens and social groups must clearly accept that the Constitution and laws are the common framework for the behavior and activity of all.

We must implement a national foreign policy and overcome confrontation on issues of national interest—a matter that is vital for Bulgaria's authority and place in the world.

The government will strive to establish cooperation with parliament first of all. During our work on the budget, we will seek generally acceptable decisions on priorities in state expenditures, on additional mobilization of resources, and on possible expenditures for social needs. In our government program, we will present the legislative priorities of the government until the end of the year and beyond, and we will propose that the commissions and all deputies focus their activity on them.

At the same time, we will seek an active dialogue and cooperation with the structures of the civil society. We will negotiate with trade unions and employers on employment, prices, and revenues. We will hold talks with the Bulgarian National Bank about the currency rate and the balance of payments. With the municipal

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organs, we will discuss the problems of the municipality concerned. With the structures of the civil society, cooperatives, unions, and associations of consumers and intelligentsia, we will discuss engaging the broadest social circles in the implementation of a national policy of stabilization and reform.

We appeal to all other state institutions—the president of the Republic, the organs of the judiciary, and the Constitutional Court—to develop cooperation with the government. Continuing the unprincipled confrontation between institutions will doom any attempt to improve the situation and effect an upsurge.

Bulgaria is entering the sixth year of changes. The vote of the citizens attested to their desire to establish civilized norms of political and social life. Therefore we appeal to the parties and groups of the center and the opposition. We expect strict but objective criticism, and understanding and support for our steps that serve the national interest. Again, we want to stress that the government of the Democratic Left will conduct a policy of national consensus, and rely on dialogue, seeking agreement, and broad cooperation in implementing its policy. This must not be seen as a sign of weakness but rather as the necessary foundation for decisive and energetic action in implementing the policy that the voters chose. This is Bulgaria's best chance.

Thank you very much.

New Government Takes Over From Caretakers

AU2601121495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 26 Jan 95

[Report by Kalina Stancheva from Council of Ministers building in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The new Bulgarian Government officially took over its functions from the caretaker cabinet this morning. Here is our reporter Kalina Stancheva with the details.

[Stancheva] At a joint meeting this morning at the Council of Ministers building at No. 1 Dondukov Street, the baton was handed over, accompanied not by the cognac traditionally drunk on such occasions but with champagne toasts being drunk in honor of the previous and the new ministers. The reason for this is because—and I quote—champagne signifies success. Outgoing Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova said: This is a break in tradition, which is nothing unusual for me.

In her good wishes, she said she hoped that instead of revising the past, the new government would show a greater measure of common sense and continue what the caretaker cabinet has started.

Zhan Videnov, leader of the government of the Democratic Left, wished all the outgoing cabinet members success in their future careers, and expressed the hope that his ministers would assume the executive power in a praiseworthy manner. He said that this power is grave and full of danger due to the uneven places in the road ahead that have to be surmounted with all the powers at their command.

Indzhova and Videnov held private talks for half an hour in the prime minister's office. Similar meetings between outgoing and incoming ministers for the purpose of introductions and briefing will be held before 3 pm today at all the ministries. Some of the new ministers know that letters of resignation are awaiting them. The private office of the Council of Ministers already has four letters of resignation from members of Reneta Indzhova's personal team.

On his way to a working lunch with his predecessor Chavdar Chervenkov, Interior Minister Lyubomir Nachev declared that he intended to keep Chief Secretary Lambov and Secretary Bengarski. As for the other secretaries, he will thank them and accept their resignations, because they do not correspond to the requirements of their posts.

At its first organizational meeting, the new government decided to meet once weekly, on Mondays, in order to give themselves more time to prepare materials in a precise manner. At the moment, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has just started a news conference.

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Deputy Disapproves of President's Reply to Orme

LD2501185995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The second part of the fourth session of the Slovak National Council began shortly after 1000 today with a controversial item on the agenda—namely, an assessment of President Michal Kovac's reply to a letter from William Orme, executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists. As you already know from our news bulletins, the president has decided not to participate in the debate on this issue. Our correspondents Ludmila Bulakova and Magda Pospisilova will tell us more about the atmosphere in parliament. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] Dusan Slobodnik, a deputy for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, stood up before his colleagues in the Slovak parliament with a lengthy contribution to the debate, beginning with the observation that it would be difficult at the present time to find a president of any country who would reply to a letter full of lies, half-truths and incriminations.

Dusan Slobodnik criticized President Michal Kovac for, in his reply, not reacting to the falsehoods in the letter from William Orme, executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists, and, instead, in fact, agreeing with them. Slobodnik expressed doubts about the credibility of the president's explanation of the most criticized part of his reply, in which he expressed the belief that the situation in the media that arose in Slovakia following the elections in 1994 was only temporary and that Slovak journalists and media organizations will soon once again be able to work according to the principles of democracy and pluralism. For the sake of completeness, I will simply recall that President Michal Kovac described the period preceding the appointment of the new government of Vladimir Meciar as an interim period.

Dusan Slobodnik concluded his speech with the following summary:

[Begin Slobodnik recording] If Slovakia was rife with the sins held against it by Mr. Orme, with substantial assistance from certain journalists—those colleagues from Slovakia to whom he referred—I would acknowledge that even the president has the right to pillory those mistakes, even before 25 institutions around the world. In such a situation, however, it would still be possible to take exception to the fact that he failed to use the opportunity to settle matters at home. Nevertheless, he would have the right to express the truth. As the saying goes, Plato is a great friend, but the truth is greater.

However, analysis of the meaning, facts, and logic of the president's reply has shown that the allegations against Slovakia do not correspond to reality. If the Slovak Republic as a normal, democratic country is to be described by the number-one citizen of our state, on the basis of such a reply signed in contradiction to the reality of the media situation, as half free with restrictions on the freedom of the press and the objectivity of information provided to citizens, I am forced to say unequivocally that President Michal Kovac did not have the moral right to write such a reply and that this is an unprecedented and improper matter for the president of any state.

Mr. President, Mr. absent President, Slovakia, when struggling through the minefield of insidiousness, lies, and false allegations that we have uncovered—we already have some clues as to how these reports get out into the world, and I shall be pursuing this matter on another occasion—does not need the kind of confirmation of lies, half-truths, and distortions represented by your reply. History does not forgive such deliberate lies. History does not forgive statesmen who, in their efforts to discredit their political opponents, discredit their own country. [end recording] [passage omitted].

Council Rules on Reply

LD2501220195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Before noon today, the debate on Slovak President Michal Kovac's reply to the letter from William Orme, the executive director of the U.S. Committee for the Protection of Journalists, opened the second half of the fourth session of the Slovak parliament. The discussion, to which five deputies contributed before the lunch break, was interrupted by dozens of factual comments often verging on insults. Our parliamentary correspondents Jarmila Bulakova and Magda Pospisilova report on the atmosphere at the afternoon session of parliament.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] Shortly before the beginning of this evening's Radiozurnal, 81 deputies voted for the proposal of HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] Deputy Tibor Cabaj.

The National Council subsequently declared that the Slovak president's's reply was an inadequate, unthinking, and unfortunate response to Mr. Orme's deeply distorted information maligning Slovakia, which contributed to discrediting the good name of the Slovak Republic abroad.

The parliament further stated that the president's refusal to attend the National Council proved that, on the one hand, he did not pay sufficient respect to the requests of the supreme law-giving body and, on the other, that he did not revise his one-sided attitudes expressed in his letter to Mr. Orme.

The National Council pronounced deep concern and disappointment at the president's hasty and biased reply. It urged the president to avoid one-sided attitudes in the future.

For the fourth point, the National Council proposed to Slovak National Council chairman to hand this resolution to the president in person. [passage omitted]

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Meciar Returns From 'Successful' Visit to Hungary

LD2501222395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar returned this evening from his two-day official visit to Hungary, which took place at the invitation of his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn. Vladimir Meciar regarded his talks with President Goencz, Prime Minister Horn, and Parliament Chairman Gal as successful. He described the talks as an attempt to establish pragmatic premises and prosperous trends of cooperation.

We look to the future with optimism, and we are confident that the past is behind us. Both parties have made steps toward cooperation, the Slovak prime minister said about the Budapest summit.

Reconciliation Treaty in Process

LD2501205495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovakia and Hungary want to close the past, and, following the German-French example, they will work out a treaty on reconciliation. A basic treaty should be signed before 21 March 1995. Slovakia should ensure a more substantial flow of water into the Danube, while our Hungarian neighbors should build an underwater weir there.

These are the results of the talks held between Prime Ministers Vladimir Meciar and Gyula Horn. Our Budapest correspondent Gregor Martin Papucsek has more details.

[Papucsek] [passage omitted] Vladimir Meciar says:

[Meciar] "In connection with the basic treaty, we confirm that we consider it realistic to sign the agreement before 21 March 1995. The Slovak Republic has proposed and pledged that it will undertake the duty to respect all existing European laws on ethnic minorities, that it will respect the controlling powers of the Council of Europe, which monitors compliance with these rules. If new laws are passed in Europe, the Slovak Republic pledges to incorporate them into its domestic legal system."

[Papucsek] [passage omitted]

[Meciar] "I look into the future with optimism, and I am confident that the past is behind us and joint goals and interests are in front of us. Both parties have taken steps necessary for mutual understanding and cooperation."

Slovaks in Hungary Want More Recognition at Home

LD2501203995 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the time of this broadcast, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is holding negotiations with Mihaly Mata, the chairman of the Association of Slovaks in Hungary, among others. Mata told Duna TV's "Newsreel" program that his association had only one political demand, which is that the Slovak minority should have parliamentary representation in Budapest as of right [alanyi jog].

[Begin Mata recording] We would be better helped if the Slovak Government granted greater recognition to the Slovaks in Hungary, regarding which it has been showing an improved tendency recently, and if it supported us morally and, if possible, financially, too. However, it is true to say that an improvement, a significant one, has taken place recently in this regard as well. [end recording]

Hungarian Deputy Decries Minority Policy

LD2501163395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Representatives of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] have told a news conference about the government policy statement and the parliamentary debate of it. However, the main point on the agenda was the two-day visit by the Hungarian coalition deputies to Budapest. Anna Samelova reports:

[Samelova] [Passage omitted] Vojtech Bugar said that, from the point of view of ethnic minorities in Slovakia, not the Hungarian minority only, this government's policy statement was the worst [je najhorsim] since 1948 because—and I qucte Vojtech Bugar—no government, not even a communist one, dared to officially declare its intention to build the state on the national principle.

MKDH deputy Julius Bardos said this was an attempt to push minorities out of their current positions. To illustrate this, he quoted the section of the policy statement that uses the term linguistically mixed territories rather than ethnically mixed territories.

Vojtech Bugar reacted to Vladimir Meciar's claim that the representatives of the Hungarian coalition are ready to hold talks with the governments of all neighboring countries except the Slovak Government. He said that, on 19 January, they delivered to the government office a letter addressed to the prime minister asking for a meeting with him and requesting the opportunity to get involved in further work on the European Stability Pact. However, the leaderships of the MKDH, Egyuetteles, and the Hungarian Civic Party insist on a joint meeting, rather than separate meetings with the individual parties, arguing that their coalition agreement stipulates that the coalition is to hold talks on important issues concerning minorities jointly, as a united Hungarian coalition.

Idea of Nation-State Criticized

LD2501164195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Bela Bugar [chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic

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Movement, MKDH, of Slovakia], since 1948 no government in Slovakia had the temerity to proclaim the idea of a nation-state as openly as is now being done by the Meciar government. Following his Budapest talks, the MKDH chairman stressed to journalists in Pozsony [Bratislava] that the new Slovak Government program openly draws a dividing line between citizens belonging to the majority nation and the minorities. He also said that the coalition of the Hungarian parties of Slovakia is ready for a dialogue with Meciar but that the prime minister only seems to favor a dialogue.

No Support From MKDH To Oust President

AU2501182795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Bela Bugar by Martin Krno; place and date not given: "We Will Not Support Unconstitutional Steps; MKDH Chairman Bela Bugar About the Prime Minister's Alleged Offer"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Information has spread to the effect that, during his recent meeting with the chairmen of three Hungarian right-wing parties in Bratislava, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar promised that he would be more accommodating toward the demands of ethnic minorities if deputies for the Hungarian coalition gave their support to the dismissal of the Slovak president. Because it is said that there is no smoke without fire, we asked Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] Chairman Bela Bugar whether the information was true.

[Bugar] After their reception by the Slovak prime minister, we held another round of talks with our three guests from Hungary. They did not indicate to us anything of that sort. They only told us that the prime minister was angry with us because we did not want to consult with him on the formation of the new government. We have sent him a letter in which we assess the position of the Hungarian minority, with emphasis on the proposed Balladur plan. In that letter we said that we would like to meet him. Even if he harbored the intention about which you speak, the Hungarian parties will always proceed in accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. They will never support unconstitutional and immoral steps.

[Krno] What, then, did your guests discuss with the Slovak prime minister?

[Bugar] Mr. Meciar suggested to them that they ought to give a thought to the establishment of contacts along party lines between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and political parties in Hungary. The prime minister claimed that the basic treaty was the priority in the development of our relations with Hungary. The representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Federation of Young Democrats, and the Christian Democratic People's Party said in response that, if we are unable to agree on the border issue and the rights of ethnic minorities, we should not place on them in this treaty as strong an emphasis as has recently been done. It would be more useful if we concentrated on economic and other relations. [passage omitted]

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Police Remove Jewish Protesters From Church

LD2501191695 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Abraham Weiss, the New York orthodox rabbi, has started a protest action within the compound of the parish church in Brzezinka [Birkenau]. [passage omitted]

Our reporter told us a quarter of an hour ago that the police have forcefully removed Rabbi Weiss and the other protesters from the church in Brzezinka.

Deputies Air Problems of New Constitution

MM2601093095 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 19 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Agata Wawrzyniak: "The Constitutional Puzzle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What state system will the new constitution guarantee in Poland? Is there a chance that the parliamentary upper chamber, the much-criticized Senate, will survive? Are we going to have a secular state or one that is on friendly terms with the church? When should we expect the promulgation of the fundamental state law to take place?

TRYBUNA SLASKA invited Union of Freedom deputy Irena Lipowicz and Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] deputy Czeslaw Sleziak, both members of the Sejm Constitutional Commission, to engage in an editorial debate on the model of our next constitution and the problems connected with its formulation.

[Lipowicz] The Union of Freedom proposes a draft constitution that is economic with words but meaningful in its content. For us, the most important aspect of the constitution act is its realistic nature. We cannot make promises regarding our social obligations that we will then be unable to meet. Our words must not mimic the empty declarations that are so typical of the constitution that was in force in the Polish People's Republic. It has since become apparent that the state cannot afford to provide such benefits as, say, an entirely free education service extending from kindergarten to every type of higher education establishment.

[Sleziak] A commitment to citizens' social rights is not necessarily an element of a left-wing ethos. After all, even the German Constitution contains a provision about the society-oriented rule-of-law state. However, today the fundamental question is whether the opposition has sufficient commitment to the promulgation of a new constitution. We must come to an agreement on the way in which we should draft a formula offering wide powers to local self-government, and we must consider carefully the Senate's future. We must know whether the constitution is to be an act containing mere declarations or certain legal norms to which all citizens will be entitled to resort.

[Lipowicz] The constitution should be a normative act establishing certain concrete rights and obligations for citizens. That is why we attach such importance to the possibility of introducing the universal right of constitutional complaint.

[Sleziak] The fundamental law should contain as few empty slogans as possible. Our proposal is a starting point for a discussion that should define, among other things, to what extent the constitution will guarantee citizens' social rights. Of course, putting in a formulation stating that every citizen has the right to work misses the point. On the other hand, it would be much more sensible to guarantee rationalization of unemployment. However, this question can be discussed further.

[Lipowicz] Free Poland has known two fundamental laws. The first was written for Pilsudski and the second against him. In practical terms, he did not use either of them. It is senseless to write constitutions geared to specific people. At present, I watch what is happening at the top echelons of power with much concern. I believe that the constitution can be promulgated only when it guarantees a balancing out of power in the state. I opt for the mixed system, which provides equal chances to act for the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers.

[Sleziak] The existence of the three-way division of power is an immanent characteristic of a rule-of-law state. Here there can be no arguments at all.

[Lipowicz] Nevertheless, concrete constitutional provisions are necessary if we are to avoid loopholes that will subsequently be used for ad hoc political maneuvering, although it should be admitted that the French Constitution, for example, is not particularly precise, yet those in power do not overinterpret its provisions.

[Sleziak] It would be a poor situation if work on the constitution were dominated by extemporaneous political problems. Instead, it is necessary to decide whether parliament should have two chambers. Personally, I opt for abolition of the Senate, although I do recognize its positive role. Nevertheless, I do not exclude the possibility of creating a second parliamentary chamber in a different form. The SLD proposes that we introduce it as the National Economy and Labor Chamber.

[Lipowicz] The concept, developed by the Polish Peasant Party, of setting up a Local Self-Government Chamber was also interesting.... But I still maintain that it is worth preserving the Senate even if we were to be displeased with its work. After all, that chamber is devised to correct the legislation. Perhaps we need to raise the age and educational requirements for Senate members. It may be necessary to put more lawyers in the Senate.

[Sleziak] There is also the question of church-state relations. I realize that, during the previous period, freedom of religion was not guaranteed. The present provisions speak rather of a friendly separation between state and church, and also of their cooperation. Even

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experts on the Polish Episcopate are against introducing into the constitution a provision describing the Catholic religion as the dominant one, or leading among others. Yet formulations of this kind have found their way into certain proposed drafts of the constitution.

[Lipowicz] I perceive a difference here. When we refer to autonomy and friendly cooperation in the Union of Freedom draft proposal, we draw on the [Second Vatican] Council formula. On the other hand, the SLD proposes a secular state formula. In any case, I wonder whether it is not already too late in Poland for the promulgation of a new constitution. Could we have already lost the chance of achieving a national accord, which was offered us by the events of 1989? Although I represent an opposition party, I cannot endorse the view that the worse things are in the state, the better for the opposition. However, when I see that the coalition rejects our proposal for a provision concerning martial law, a proposal that is, after all, very moderate, I confess to having serious doubts whether a compromise is at all possible. I am an advocate of the introduction into the constitutional provisions of a preamble that could refer to the freedom-fighting traditions related to the rise of the Solidarity movement. There was a time when I thought that would not be necessary. But some recent events, certain controversial nominations, and the triumphalist attitudes of those in power arouse my worst fears. In our constitution, we must state clearly where we come from, who we are, and where we are going.

[Sleziak] This is an issue over which we may yet become divided. The ultimate appraisal of the events of 1981 should be left to historians. This problem has never been properly discussed by my own political formation, either. But we must think ahead. I believe that there are sufficient objective, substantive preconditions allowing us to draw up and promulgate a new constitution. However, I wonder whether our political elites have enough imagination and whether the presidential campaign may not yet come to dominate all that is nowadays happening in Poland.

Court: Journalists Excluded From Secrecy Clause

WS2401134695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Jan Ordynski: "Important Ruling by the Supreme Court: Journalists Excluded From Confidentiality Clause"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Journalists and editors in chief cannot refuse to testify about circumstances that are normally protected by the obligation to keep professional secrets if the court or prosecutor exempts them from that commitment.*

This exemption is applicable only when a journalist's testimony pertaining to circumstances falling under the professional secret clause is crucial to the ruling in a specific criminal case. Such is the gist of a resolution passed by seven members of the Supreme Court on 19 January.

The Voivodship Court in Lublin appealed to the Supreme Court to pass such a ruling following a complaint filed by Waclaw Bialy, editor in chief of GAZETA W LUBLINIE, a regional version of GAZETA WYBORCZA.

Bialy was a witness in a libel case. The regional court ruled a fine of 2 million zlotys and 14 days of detention for refusal to decipher the initials of the author of an item published in GAZETA. In his defense, Bialy quoted article 15 of the press law, which states that the author of a press article has the right to remain anonymous.

The Voivodship Court, handing the case over to the Supreme Court, said, among other things, that a ruling that a court or prosecutor can exclude a journalist from the obligation to keep a professional secret could lead to a situation in which these legal bodies will have access to confidential information, which in turn might cause the credibility and status of the journalistic profession to decline.

The Voivodship Court asked whether provisions of the press law on keeping professional secrets are lex specialis to Article 163 of the penal code ("Individuals obliged to keep professional secrets or secrets pertaining to their profession may refuse to testify about the circumstances falling under this obligation unless the prosecutor exempts these persons from the obligation of keeping a secret"), whether the court or prosecutor can exempt a journalist from the obligation defined in Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the press law, and whether refusal to disclose the name of the author of a published item constitutes an illegal refusal to testify (Article 244, Paragraph 1 of the penal code).

The Supreme Court ruled that Article 163 of the penal code is lex specialis to Article 15, Paragraph 2 and Article 16 of the press law, which, in general terms, regulate the obligation to keep professional secrets by journalists.

The ruling means that Bialy will have to tell the court who was the author of the publication in question.

Civilian Control Over Secret Services Viewed

WS2501140095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Jan 95 p 12

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Secret Services Under Special Control: Muzzle or Loose Bridle for Scorpions?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *No one questions the necessity of establishing parliamentary control over the secret services. Opinions differ, however, as to the form and scope of interfering with the operations of civilian and military intelligence and counterintelligence. "They do not want control, they want power," commentators say on the draft*

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bill providing for the establishing of a parliamentary committee for secret services within the Office of State Protection [UOP]. "The secret services do not want to be controlled, they want the committee to confine its activities to budgetary issues and not to have access to any information," retort the deputies, authors of the draft.

The issue of control over the secret services resurfaces whenever any controversial staffing or operational decisions are made within UOP or the Military Information Services [WSI]. Moreover, given the existing political divisions in Poland, the particular centers of power rival each other for control over the secret services. It is a common belief that both the president and the prime minister are attempting to subordinate the secret services, be it formally or not. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is also alleged to crave influence on the secret services and access to information through parliamentary committee channels. Among supporters of that view are politicians from the opposition.

The rivalry for control over the civilian and military services as well as attempts at politicizing them are enhanced by a lack of precise statutory and constitutional provisions. A draft amendment to the UOP bill has already been presented to the Sejm, and the Ministry of National Defense [MON] is preparing a draft bill on the WSI.

Between the President and the Prime Minister

According to current legislation, the head of UOP—"the central authority of state administration responsible for ensuring state security"—is subordinated to the minister of internal affairs. The prime minister appoints the head of UOP at the motion of the minister of internal affairs after having consulted the Political Advisory Committee at the Minister of the Interior (that committees opinion is binding neither for the minister, nor the prime minister). The law on the office of the interior minister provides that he supervises the operations of UOP.

Formally speaking, therefore, the head of UOP is subordinated to the minister of internal affairs, who in turn is a cabinet member and the prime minister's "subordinate." According to the so-called small constitution, however, the president "safeguards" and "is chiefly responsible for internal state security," which implies that the legislator has assumed him to be partially responsible for this field. The small constitution goes on to add that "the advisory organ to the president in this respect is the National Security Council [RBN]" (the law on compulsory military service which gives legal validity for the National Defense Committee [KOK] remains effective. RBN, headed by Henryk Goryszewski, is KOK's executive body. Goryszewski is simultaneously secretary of the latter.) There are no detailed regulations on the forms of contacts and possible dependencies between the president, the interior minister, and the head of UOP.

Article 61 of the small constitution provides only that the prime minister comes forth with a motion to appoint the interior and defense ministers (as well as the foreign minister) after having consulted the president. The provision does not state whether the president's opinion is binding or whether the candidate would have to be put forth by the president. The current government has broadened the interpretation of this provision, allowing the establishment of the so-called presidential ministries [Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, National Defense]. Is it possible for the president, either directly or through representatives, to obtain information (including that pertaining to operations) directly from the heads of UOP and WSI without the knowledge of the interior and defense ministers? According to article 7 paragraph 3 of the law on the office of the interior minister, if information obtained by the secret services he supervises is important in terms of state security, he is obliged to impart it immediately to the president and the prime minister of the Republic of Poland. The UOP law states that its head is obliged to pass on that type of information immediately to the prime minister and the interior minister. There is no mention of the president. He is to be referred to in the amendment to the UOP law: in emergency cases the head of UOP shall be obliged also to convey the information to the president, informing the interior minister of having done so. In reality, this provision sanctions an already existing practice—the prime minister and the president obtain identical information. The interior minister authorized the head of UOP to also share it with the president. A gentleman's agreement is currently in force according to which material passed on to the president and information on missions assigned to UOP are filed also to the minister of internal affairs. It sometimes happened in the past that such information was conveyed without the interior minister's knowledge. Does that ever happen anymore? Opinions vary. The head of UOP strongly denies ever having obtained orders directly from the president or, for instance, Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

The small constitution states that the Council of Ministers "is responsible for internal state security." It is thus perfectly natural that the prime minister and the government have special tasks they assign to the heads of the secret services. The same question, however, appears as in the case of the president: given the current legislation and the status of the secret services within the ministries, can this be done completely behind the backs of the interior and defense ministers, and, as far as WSI is concerned, behind the back of the head of General Staff to which WSI is directly subordinated? The UOP law provides for simultaneity in informing the prime minister and the minister. The head of WSI assured us that, of course, he may convey information directly to the prime minister, but the head of the General Staff and the defense minister are informed at the same time, as is the case of tasks assigned by the prime minister. What happens when there is no defense minister?

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The head of UOP claims the prime minister personally assigns him tasks from time to time, but he always informs the minister of internal affairs and the relayed information is consulted.

It is impossible to imagine that the president and prime minister would not use information gathered by intelligence or employ the secret services in implementing foreign policy. Which of these power centers, however, has priority in assigning tasks to these services? A statement made by the head of UOP implies that the prime minister does so more frequently. The head of the WSI refused to answer such a question. It is known, however, that the president uses the services of the intelligence quite frequently.

Old Ideas Reviewed

The idea of separating the secret services from the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] has often resurfaced over the past five years. Work on this was most advanced in 1992 after Macierewicz's "file scandal." In the period between July and September of that year, MSW developed a document providing for several variants of positioning the services:

1. Under the Supervision of the Prime Minister

Argument "for": the prime minister's office is the decisionmaking center of the executive power in Poland which uses the intelligence services most extensively. Against: the prime minister would become directly responsible for the operations of the secret services; the necessity would arise to establish an intermediary body supervising the secret services, which in reality would lead to subordinating them to state officers; it would be difficult to guarantee the president with his statutory privileges; finally, as the fourth argument, frequent changes of government jeopardize the stability of the secret services.

2. Under the Supervision of the President

Supporting arguments include the time duration of the president's term in office and the fact that the president coordinates foreign policy. Arguments against: the lack of adequate legislation, including Constitutional provisions (not even the small constitution existed at the time); the fate of the National Security Office—the president wanted this to be a structure with real influence on security issues, meanwhile it became a facade, without any practical authority, suspended in midair beyond the grasp of existing decision centers.

3. Under the Supervision of a Special Committee

A collegial body would be established (an equivalent of, for instance, the National Broadcasting Council), members of which would include representatives of the president, the prime minister, and relevant ministries. It would have supervisory and coordinative powers, develop long-term projects, manage funds. WSI and UOP would be subordinated to it, and, according to another variant, intelligence would be removed from the UOP structure.

4. Detachment of UOP from the MSW

The head of UOP would be ranked as minister for secret services and would be a cabinet member. Another variation of this project provided for separating intelligence as well. This would not be possible without certain Constitutional amendments.

In the fall of 1992, work on the development of those concepts was suddenly suspended. The president fiercely protested any changes being made in the secret services at the time. There was a conspicuous lack of political will to carry them out. With the benefit of hindsight it was undoubtedly very well that the secret services remained within ministerial structures—at least they were guaranteed a minimum level of stability.

Concepts of excluding intelligence and counterintelligence always met with the insurmountable obstacle of who they should be subordinated to. Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski best defined this dilemma in a speech delivered at a security conference held last year by Zbigniew Bujak: "The current status of intelligence is the lesser evil. It is quite easy to separate it from the UOP and MSW structures. If the prime minister takes over, however, it will actually be subordinated to the Office of the Council of Ministers, and, if the president does, the President's Chancellory will be in control. State officials will be so irresistibly tempted to carry out their own political games that it is better to leave intelligence within MSW than allow it to follow orders issued by incompetent officials. It is abnormal for intelligence to be included within the structure of MSW, yet considering the current political turmoil only Andrzej Milczanowski can guarantee it with any stability."

What Is Military to the Military?

The status of WSI is a somewhat different issue. Once the Internal Military Service [WSW] was dissolved in 1990, the Military Police [Zandarmeria Wojskowa] and Military Counterintelligence [Kontrwywiad Wojskowy] were established. The Intelligence and Counterintelligence Board of the General Staff of the Polish Army were formed from the II Board of the General Staff (intelligence) and the WSW Military Counterintelligence. In October 1991, the Chief Administration of Military Information Services was established and subordinated to the defense minister. Thus WSI combines military intelligence (formerly Board II at the General Staff) and military counterintelligence. On 24 February 1994, the Information Services Bureau of the Minister of National Defense, subordinated to the minister, was separated from WSI. The remaining WSI structures were subordinated to the head of the General Staff of the Polish Army. According to MON, the General Staff, and the head of WSI these services should remain within the military and be subordinated to the head of General Staff.

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WSW was very active in penetrating the underground opposition, which is still often brought against WSI. The majority of relevant documents were destroyed. Although verification caused more than 70 percent of people from the former military counterintelligence to leave, allegedly including all those who held any top posts, the process was only "internal," and thus, as is assumed, more "mild." It is thought that for this reason WSI is a relic of a bygone era in the negative sense of the term. In 1990 it was discovered that WSW was destroying files and an investigation was instigated. A Sejm subcommittee established for examining operations of the former WSW stated that the service penetrated the political opposition. Approximately 70 percent of the files were destroyed both at the central level and in field units. General Bula is alleged to have issued oral orders to do so. In September 1991, the Military Prosecutor's Office for the Warsaw Military District filed a case against him, his three deputies, and five other high officials. The trial began in the same year, and a sentence has not been passed as yet. That year also saw press reports on the failure of former WSW Head for the Silesian Military District Colonel Stanislaw Torebko to recruit a Sejm deputy from the Xth parliamentary term.

The former WSW consisted of several (5-6) boards. We were unable to find out how many people it employed. The WSI head told us only that before structural reforms and the establishing of WSI, the staff of central intelligence and counterintelligence units were cut by approximately 40 percent. More than 70 percent of people left counterintelligence alone, and the number of field units was cut by 60 percent. It is estimated that WSI currently employs several thousand people. With the hindsight of the negative experience of civilian services during Macierewicz's term in office (as MSW head), the lack of external verification should theoretically enable military intelligence and counterintelligence to regain their power. Meanwhile, both the president and the prime minister doubt their efficacy.

All top positions in WSI, from head of department upwards, have to be approved by the minister. According to the head of WSI, due to the role, objectives, and character of these services, and the fact that they are operating under conditions of continual threats, they should be subordinated directly to the commander in chief of the Armed Forces and adjusted to the military structures. He agrees with the necessity of establishing civilian control, mainly for the purpose of defining fields and methods of operations, and assessing the effects of WSI commensurate with expenditures. He is against interfering with operations as such.

"Of course, we must sometimes use industrial or trade companies as a cover. But when the operations of any company cover for the secret services, everything is in perfect order so that it need not fear any inspections. After all, we have to protect our structures and people," said Colonel Malejczyk in an interview for TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY.

The Military Attache Offices continue to exist within WSI. In the beginning of 1994, the attache offices were excluded from WSI and subordinated to the head of the military department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The decision, however, never became effective. Poland has its military attaches in 38 countries—in nearly all the European states as well as the United States, Canada, Israel, Syria, Japan, China, Egypt, and others.

Executive structures of the WSI, which are command units and units where projects are defined and implemented, are subordinated to the head of General Staff. The defense minister retained his responsibility for the overall policy of the services, keeping to the budget, staffing, and the application of so-called operational techniques, for instance bugging devices. The minister has to issue a decision and the prosecutor general must agree before bugging devices are installed. These are the tasks of the Information Services Bureau of the Minister of National Defense. Assignments for WSI may be ordered both by the head of General Staff and the defense minister. The prime minister and president usually do so through them, although it is, obviously, possible for them to issue such orders directly. The head of WSI assured us that information for the prime minister and president reaches their addressees directly (through secret chancellories).

Cooperation or Rivalry?

To some extent, UOP and WSI compete with one another and although both claim cooperation is good, they are very reserved in mutual contacts. Theoretically, their competences should not overlap, but in practice this sometimes does occur. It is unofficially known, for instance, that the president commissions WSI to carry out purely "civilian" tasks. The prime minister issued instructions presenting the interdependencies and divisions between these services in minute detail. WSI was assigned tasks pertaining to counterintelligence protection of specific fields of the domestic economy related to the Armed Forces (for instance enterprises and research centers carrying out projects or production for the needs of the military; economic entities trading products, technologies, and licenses which fall under the clause of state secrets for reasons of national defense, but only in the case of an organizational unit of the Armed Forces or subordinated to MON). These tasks were definitely excluded from the authorities of UOP, which remains responsible for the protection of other branches of the economy.

A huge part of the instruction is devoted to the area where operations of the related services overlap. Apart from formulating the principles of coordination of operations and broad exchange of information (for instance on hazards to national security, operations of foreign secret services, radiocounterintelligence), particularly striking is a provision on joint counterintelligence protection of licenses, transfer of military technologies, and international arms, ammunition and explosives trade.

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Cooperation between UOP and WSI provides also for the exchange of personal data obtained due to operational and reconnoitering activities.

What Will It Be Like in Practice?

The deputy draft bill (see same page) [not included] is preliminary and may still be altered in the routine parliamentary procedures. Regardless of what the bill's final shape is, practice will show whether a Sejm committee will actually exercise control over the services and how effective it will be.

The Administration and Internal Affairs Commission actually has all the authority it needs to protect national security, and thus, theoretically at least, exercises control over the secret services. In practice, however, the head of UOP and the defense minister will decide how much and what type of information they will reveal when answering the deputies' questions. The fact that the special committee assigns itself authority over "WSI's and UOP's intelligence and counterintelligence operations does not necessarily imply that it will be in control. The deputies have a legal right to have access to state secrets and confidential information. They have to have the consent of the interior or defense minister every time they want to obtain access to highly classified confidential materials. Will it thus become yet another committee without any real powers?

"We will never agree to a facade committee which would become merely a cover up for the operations of the secret services if it were not given any real power," says Deputy Jerzy Dziewulski. "The bill on state and professional secret protection is to define the factual authority of the deputies and specify what type of information they will have access to. We are considering an amendment to the current law," he adds.

According to Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski, former head of MSW, we do not have any experience in civilian control over UOP and WSI, thus even the most extreme scenarios are probable. As one version has it, members of the committee treat it instrumentally, wishing to interfere unduly in secret service operations, which means that they either undermine the very services, or the threatened services begin to avoid answering questions, select the information they convey, mislead the deputies, or even lie. In another scenario, the committee is incapable of exercising any control at all because it does not have the necessary authority and becomes a "smoke screen" for the secret services. The arguments of both sides should thus be carefully weighed.

One cannot take a negative attitude from the very beginning. All over the world secret services tend to push towards independence and escape all control, but such control is necessary. After all, cooperation may be excellent. A lot will depend on the skills of the committee and mutual trust. Staffing will also play a tremendous role. Fears have arisen that since the draft states the committee members may not be members of any other committees, the parliamentary clubs will nominate deputies from back benches. It remains uncertain whether such a committee will be "leak tight." The problem is not only with inquisitive journalists, but the fact that the deputies will be targeted by agents of foreign intelligence. Dziewulski admits that apart from signing an agreement on the obligation to keep state secrets and penal sanctions by the deputies, there is no guarantee that classified information will not leak out from the committee. He says the political responsibility of the chairmen of parliamentary clubs nominating deputies to sit on the special committee gives some guarantee. He categorically objects to prior verification of the candidates by the secret services. Other politicians are not so eager to agree. UOP and WSI consider this an indisputable prerequisite for security reasons. It should also be stressed that the knowledge those deputies acquire is also related to responsibility for the secret services. Such people should be provided with personal protection, not only for the term of the Sejm, but also for some time after it expires. To secure confidentiality, it should be established where the committee is to gather, where and how classified materials will be filed, etc.

The largest controversy between MSW and MON is due to parliamentary control over the secret services. "The committee should not have access to information on secret agents. We want to investigate specific cases, and not the overall activities of the services. We do not want to take UOP apart," states Dziewulski. "Besides, no one knows what level of skills the secret services represent. What are their achievements? Perhaps they do not have any at all and there is nothing to destabilize? Someone has to verify their efficacy and assess the management of budget funds and other financial means."

SLD politicians deny that the attempt to establish the committee is targeted at their party's gaining access to the secret services. Yet both the secret services themselves and the opposition politicians claim that creating such a committee will give this group an advantage only the president and prime minister had.

The committee will fill a certain void, yet a different problem remains open: lack of coordination and no uniform system of assigning tasks for the secret services. Rival power centers are incapable of reaching an agreement on foreign policy. Thus it remains unclear what the objectives of Poland's intelligence are to be. The prime minister and president assign single tasks, leaving the rest up to the secret services themselves. Meanwhile, long term assignments are needed. Chaos in the decision-making process also means that counterintelligence does not sufficiently protect the Polish arms industry or "special equipment" trade.

RZECZPOSPOLITA tried to learn about the stance of the president and the prime minister. We posed two questions: on parliamentary control and on the status of the secret services in the overall state structure.

Henryk Goryszewski said he could speak only in his own name: "I am for parliamentary control, but it cannot

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destabilize the secret services. As far as their separation is concerned, I believe UOP and WSI should be provided with conditions for normal operations, leaving them within their hitherto structures."

[Belweder] Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski gave us the following answer: "Secret services, both civilian and military, should be subordinated to the president as he is the most reliable power center in Poland. Subordinating them to the prime minister would cause their politicalization."

We tried to obtain a reply from Prime Minister Pawlak for more than a month, after which he finally refused to comment.

Pawlak Delays Petroleum Sector Reform

WS2501145095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Jan 95 p 11

[Article by Jacek Czarnecki: "The Oil Sector Project Is Now Waiting Only for the Prime Minister's Signature: No Move Without a Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The project for restructuring and privatization of the petroleum sector, contrary to previous unofficial announcements, was not on the agenda of the 23 January session of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM]. According to reliable sources, the restructuring project was removed from the agenda at the request of Prime Minister Pawlak.*

The last working meeting between Prime Minister Pawlak, head of an interministerial team for restructuring the petroleum sector Minister Marek Pol, directors of all refineries, the Petroleum Industry Center [CPN], the Oil Pipeline Exploitation Enterprises [PERN], Ciech, and the Polish Chamber of Liquid Fuels [PIPP] was held on 20 January at the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. The subject of discussion was a document (dated January 1995) containing the restructuring project prepared by the interministerial team. The project is nearly identical with a project prepared for the fuel industry presented by RZECZPOSPOLITA on 30 December of last year in an article entitled "The Petroleum Industry Project. Delayed Before Launched."

The Same Document

The document we quoted at the time was dated 10 October 1994. Since then Prime Minister Pawlak has been stalling with issuing his crucial decision. The wait is over four months now, and, according to PIPP, the petroleum industry is losing approximately one million dollars daily in value without the restructuring project in place. Other representatives of the sector agree with PIPP's estimations.

According to our information, Prime Minister Pawlak is alleged to have stated at the URM meeting that restructuring of the petroleum sector should be launched as soon as possible and that KERM should examine the project prepared by the interministerial team at the next session (on 23 January). The project was to be passed on to the Council of Ministers and then presented to the relevant Sejm committee. This never happened. Why?

For obvious reasons, everyone we spoke to wished to retain their anonymity.

Podkanski Has a Different Concept

According to our sources, one of the reasons why Prime Minister Pawlak has been hampering the petroleum sector restructuring project for several months is the fact that Ciech was not included in the structure of what is to be the Polish Petroleum Company [PKN]. The project provides that PKN is to be formed only from petroleum processing plants (refineries), distributors (CPN and private gas stations), and PERN. Ciech does not meet structural requirements for the thus defined petroleum sector as it is a trade company.

The exclusion of Ciech from the PKN structure is looked upon with scorn both by Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Leslaw Podkanski, who spoke about a huge concern in which Ciech was to play a leading role last summer, shortly after Ciech President Marian Malecki was dismissed, and Prime Minister Pawlak. Minister Podkanski would like to implement a project for restructuring the petroleum and chemical industries developed by current President of Ciech Zdzislaw Matkiewicz. This project, turning upside down all hitherto settlements worked out by the interministerial team, is approved neither by the majority of the petroleum sector representatives nor by top authorities at the Ministry of Industry and Trade [MPiH], nor by the Ministry of Ownership Transformations [MPW]. The Ciech project is so imprecise that it has been quipped as the "project without a project." The very fact that it does exist and is supported by some members of the government is enough to impede the launching of the restructuring of the petroleum industry.

Our informers ask themselves how is it possible that a project developed by an interministerial team comprised of representatives of key ministries (MPiH, MPW, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation) is being blocked by a scheme supported by a single ministry, whereas the very structure of the team explicitly shows the project is representative of all the participating ministries.

The Resistance of Officers

Another reason why Prime Minister Pawlak is delaying making a decision is the resistance of CPN officers to any changes in the sector. Particularly active in this respect are employees of the 17 district administrations CPN runs across the country. They employ approximately 1,500 officers. Once the sector restructuring is launched, their positions and probably their very jobs would be in jeopardy.

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CPN employees are exerting pressure on Deputy Minister of Industry Roman Czerwinki, the number one man on the interministerial team, to prevent restructuring as provided for in the project.

Following the RZECZPOSPOLITA publication of details of the October 1994 project on 30 December last year, Solidarity appealed to the Sejm, the Senate, the government, press, television, and others protesting against the presented restructuring of the sector. The trade union quoted a protocol of agreement signed in August 1994 in which Deputy Minister Czerwinski took on the obligation to include refinery gas stations in the CPN network and to consider the possibility of CPN having a stake in refineries. Both the October 1994 and January 1995 projects provide for a converse solution, namely that the refineries have stakes in CPN.

This Thursday (26 January) Minister Czerwinski will once again "report" to the union, explaining the conclusions of the entire interministerial team which Solidarity seemingly did not take a liking to.

Another reason for delaying the restructuring of the petroleum industry our interlocutors mention is the fear on the part of decisionmakers that political conflict may ensue, erupting at the time the authorities of PKN are to be appointed.

The Opinions of Those Concerned

After Prime Minister Pawlak withdrew the restructuring project from the KERM session agenda, we asked representatives of the petroleum sector for their assessment of the effects of delaying the launching of the project. Here are some replies:

—Gdansk Refinery SA [Joint Stock Company] Director Wlodzimierz Dyrka: "It is not within my authority to evaluate the agenda of the KERM session. That agenda is laid down by the head of KERM, and that is his task, not mine. All I can do is express my dismay that the restructuring of the petroleum sector has been put off once again for the indefinite future. And we are running out of time," said Director Dyrka.

—CPN representative: "We have already waited four years, we can wait a little longer. Currently, staff representatives are evaluating the latest project. The Workers' Council will decide on Thursday whether our staff approves of the project or not. Besides, as I have often stated, reforms in the petroleum industry are absolutely necessary and the faster they are launched the better. That decision, however, does not belong to CPN. It should be made at the top."

—Ciech, Press Spokesman Andrzej Rutkowski: "It is true that Ciech would like to be a part of PKN, but our firm has no influence on what KERM does. Decisions are made outside Ciech, therefore I cannot comment on the decision to remove the project for restructuring the petroleum sector from the KERM session agenda."

—PIPP, Director Andrzej Szczesniak: "If privatization of the petroleum sector is really to take off, the decisionmakers must realize that delaying restructuring costs approximately one million dollars daily. That is how much Polish refineries, the gas station network, and others are losing in the price strategic investors would be willing to pay. The decrease in value of the sector accelerates as we approach March 1997, when the market will open up to foreign competition. Without restructuring the Polish petroleum industry will be weak in terms of technology and organization, and might not even survive confrontation with huge petroleum concerns. The costs of maintaining a structure dating back to the People's Republic are a burden to the entire economy. They may be estimated on the basis of allowances granted to CPN and refineries importing fuel. No such allowances are made to the private sector. Prolonging allowances on excise and customs costs trillions of zlotys each year. We believe restructuring of the petroleum sector is absolutely necessary," claims PIPP Director Andrzej Szczesniak.

CEFTA To Liberalize Agricultural Trade

WS2501163195 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 25 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by "U.K.": "CEFTA Liberalizes Agricultural Trade: Training for the Free Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Beginning on 1 January 1996, member states of the Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA] (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary) and Slovenia will cut customs on agricultural and food products by 50 percent, and three years later, on 1 January 1998 [as published], they will do away with them altogether.*

"Liberalizing trade by lifting nontariff barriers and systematically eliminating customs was the purpose of establishing CEFTA. The project is in line with agreements signed by the prime ministers of member states during a meeting held in Poznan last year," said Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Smietanko at a press conference concluding two days of a session attended by agriculture ministers from CEFTA states held in Warsaw.

It was established that, by 1 July of this year, all CEFTA states and Slovenia will sign bilateral agreements on the acknowledgment of health certificates and veterinary standards as well as quality certificates for agricultural and food products. These agreements should improve the exchange of these goods and eliminate sales of poor-quality products. According to the minister, this will increase trade in our region as early as the second half of this year.

The ministers emphasized that all regulations will be subordinated to the provisions of the Uruguay Round GATT agreements, which are considered to be superior.

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This pertains in particular to the removal of nontariff barriers in favor of customs, which are eventually to be gradually decreased.

Liberalization of agricultural and food products trade between our countries thus far brought meager effects. A mere 7 percent of foodstuffs imported to the Polish market come from CEFTA states. We have had a negative balance for several years—last year it amounted to $22 million. This is disproportionate to the capacity of the particular countries. Agriculture in our states is hugely complementary, thus increasing turnover in mutual trade lies in everyone's interest.

According to the agriculture minister, the latest decisions allow well-known products to return to the Polish market. Czech beer, Slovak wine, Hungarian paprika, corn, and tomatoes should reappear in Poland, and Polish goods should find their way to the markets of the other countries.

Implementation of the recent agreements will be a type of training for the processes our countries will undergo once we become members of the European Union [EU].

The ministers have also decided to issue a joint memorandum in which they will appeal to the EU to accelerate liberalization and open its markets to the agricultural and food products from CEFTA states and Slovenia. The participants of the meeting stated that exports from our countries to the EU encounter far too many obstacles and restrictions from Western partners.

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Silajdzic Departs for Austria, Brussels, U.S.

AU2501200195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today left Sarajevo for Vienna, where he will meet with Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock. Prime Minister Silajdzic will also hold talks with U.S. Ambassador in Vienna Swanee Hunt and a number of other diplomats and officials.

Prime Minister Silajdzic will be visiting Brussels tomorrow, where he will meet with Van den Broek, EU [European Union] commissioner for foreign affairs. Afterwards, the prime minister will travel to Washington at the invitation of Congressman Christopher Smith, head of the U.S. Congress Helsinki Committee. During his stay in Washington, Silajdzic will also meet with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other U.S. officials.

In the talks, emphasis will be placed on clarifying U.S. positions on the Contact Group plan, as President Izetbegovic announced in his address to correspondents today. Following his visit in Washington, Prime Minister Silajdzic will then travel to Moscow at the invitation of the Russian Government. Besides political issues, they will also discuss supplying Bosnia-Herzegovina with Russian natural gas.

Zulfikarpasic: B-H Federation Only Temporary

95BA0090A Ljubljana REPUBLIKA in Slovene 18 Dec 94 p 17

[Interview with Adil Zulfikarpasic, leader of an opposition party and author, by Aleksandar Mlac; place and date not given: " 'Izetbegovic Is a Dictator'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Azil Zulfikarpasic warns that Bosnia is sinking into fundamentalism.*

[Passage omitted] [Mlac] The book *Bosnjak—Adil Zulfikarpasic* came out last spring. Since then, events n Bosnia-Herzegovina have happened one after another very quickly. How would you very briefly sum up that period?

[Zulfikarpasic] That period has shown that in spite of incredibly violent aggression, which was aimed at destroying a certain people—the Bosnian Muslim people—in order to take over its living space and destroy its cultural heritage, that aim has nevertheless failed. In spite of the gigantic casualties, 300,000 dead, 1.5 million displaced, and 70,000 raped women, the Bosnian Muslims have not been destroyed, and they have certain prospects.

[Mlac] What gives you confidence in that? The peace plan that has been offered, or something else?

[Zulfikarpasic] No, none of the peace plans. Bosnia-Herzegovina should not accept the offered partition, according to which 49 percent of the territory would belong to the Serbs, and 51 percent to the federation with the Croats. That would mean accepting the failure of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia. They would turn into what the chetniks did not succeed in forcing—a protectorate of Serbia—with the difference that they would turn into a protectorate of Croatia. That would be a shortsighted policy. The Bosnian Muslim-Croatian federation should be adopted for a respite, as a possibility for realizing the basic conditions for surviving and continuing the battle against the aggressor, reorganizing the army, and coming up with an effective strategy. In the struggle for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina we have proven that we can win a single battle, but not yet the war. It is also necessary to prepare intelligently for that, so that we can avoid the mistakes in the past.

[Mlac] What do you consider the mistakes in the past?

[Zulfikarpasic] If our forces had been withdrawn immediately after the gifted General Dudakovic, with the Fifth Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, occupied part of the Bosnian Krajina, and concentrated in the defense of Grabez and Bihac, we would not be in such a situation today. We should have done that and waited to get weapons. The United States, i.e., Bosnia's friends in the Congress and Senate, are working to lift the embargo, and there are also friends in Islamic countries who are willing to help us.

In the second place, if we had made a strategic withdrawal after Dudakovic's penetration, the Serbian mobilization would not have been as strong. Karadzic could not have mobilized the Serbs in Croatia, and several thousand volunteers would not have come from Serbia and Montenegro; they even came from Russian and Ukraine. Because of their strong perception of a threat, the Serbs succeeded, and Europe and the world viewed their offensive simply as a recovery of "their" territories. Thus, Bihac, just like Srebrenica and Gorazde, turned from a strong military area into an isolated area, full of refugees, from which it is difficult to conduct a war of liberation.

[Mlac] Isn't there also a double standard on the part of the international community?

[Zulfikarpasic] Look, there is almost no prominent politician or intellectual in the world with whom I have not discussed this problem. I realized that we had to make several distinctions. The French press and intelligentsia are on our side, for example, but the government and the French General Staff are not on our side. The same thing is true of most other countries. That should also be seen as harshly and terribly on our side; we are cherishing a big illusion that has had terrible consequences, namely that someone else will fight for us. Europe has never been prepared to fight for anyone else, even if it was attacked, unless its vital interests were affected. They say, "We will not fight on the side of the Muslims against the Serbs,"

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and thus their actions against the aggressor are also lukewarm and ineffective, as also demonstrated by the latest NATO action in the vicinity of Bihac. They imposed an embargo on importing weapons, but in spite of that everyone has been armed except the Bosnian Muslims. At one time Croatia also imposed an embargo on us, and thus the weapons that we had procured ended up in their hands. It is true that Croatia has changed its position to some extent, but in the meantime too much time has passed.

[Mlac] You are the president of the Muslim-Bosnian Organization, one of the parliamentary parties. How do you view the internal processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are taking place in the middle of the war?

[Zulfikarpasic] Look, another important thing that has happened since my book came out is the fact that the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] is trying to use every political means possible to destroy all other political forces and introduce a one-party dictatorship. As if they did not have any more important business at this time, they want to purge all institutions of those who are not completely loyal to them, and they want to crush our intelligentsia and give them a choice—either be our boys, or else there is no room for you in public and political life in general in Bosnia. It is precisely for that reason that the SDA wants to hold elections at this time. Alija Izetbegovic, in spite of all this, still enjoys the people's confidence, in spite of all his mistakes and blunders. As his political opponent, I give him credit for that. He wants to use it in order to strengthen his political position

What bothers me most is that in the most difficult times for our country, the leading politicians are losing a sense of proportion and reality, as if some enemy hand were guiding them. Because of such steps, the broad front in the struggle for liberation has been demoralized and destroyed.

I also oppose the misuse of religion in establishing a political system. I have always been against it, and I always will be. I am a faithful Muslim and I have fought for the emancipation of Islam in our country my whole life. It is another matter that we are primitively imitating central Asia and northern Africa, which after all do not have anything to do with real religious commandments. We are thus intensifying the fragmentation of our state. Islam means progress, science, and culture. Our people care a great deal about religion, but they should not fall into the darkness of fundamentalism. We should become part of Europe, and share its fate, without weakening in any way our ties with the Islamic world and Islamic centers.

Consequently, what awaits us is a great struggle for internal democracy and tolerance. That struggle has to become an important factor and guiding light in the struggle for the liberation of Bosnia. Let me repeat that, in my opinion, that is the only way that we can mobilize all our strength. If we focus everything on Procrustes' bed, just one mold, unanimity, dictatorship, the defeat of our intelligentsia may turn into the fact of demobilization, and that only suits our enemy....

[Mlac] ...Which has obviously not given up the concept of a Greater Serbia.

[Zulfikarpasic] There is no doubt that Serbia is ruled by those who support the concept of a Greater Serbia, and the opposition perhaps even more energetically than Milosevic. I myself think that the concept of a Greater Serbia will not vanish just like that. If not for this war, this catastrophe, it would obviously have had less of a chance to survive. Since our people has its own intelligentsia, a national dynamic, and power, it could have resisted all of this. We had more technical intelligence, experts in medicine, economics, and computer science than all the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia together. I am mentioning the Croats and Croatia because the idea of a Greater Croatia is equally fatal for us. Both concepts have destroyed our towns and "cleansed" our territories.

[Mlac] After everything that has happened and is happening, do you believe in the possibility of coexistence in this region?

[Zulfikarpasic] I do, because coexistence is the only alternative to death, and because life is always stronger than death. I do, because there are already many wonderful instances that confirm that belief. I do, because I want to believe in life and the survival of my people.

Zotov on Contact Group Talks With Bosnians

LD2501190595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1825 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 25 (TANJUG)—Russia's representative in the "Contact Group" for Bosnia, Aleksandr Zotov, Wednesday said the group did not get clear answers in talks with the warring Bosnian sides.

Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA quoted Zotov as saying after talks with the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo, that the Contact Group would continue peace efforts to convince both sides to accept the Contact Group plan as a basis for negotiation.

On Tuesday Zotov and the other members of the other Contact Group (made up of Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany) met with the Bosnian Serb representatives. Zotov said both meetings aimed to create conditions for resuming the peace process in Bosnia where a four-month ceasefire is in force after 34 months of fighting.

SRNA quoted Muslim Sarajevo Radio as saying that Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic had proposed to the Contact Group that the Bosnian Serbs be given a two-month deadline to give their final answer to the Contact Group plan.

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Muslim Presidency Vice-President Ejup Ganic said Tuesday that the Muslim Government had agreed that the Contact Group plan "could be a basis for negotiation," but insisted that the Bosnian Serbs first sign the plan and only then discuss possible changes.

The July Contact Group plan calls for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina by giving 51 percent of the territory to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs have said this division was unjust since it gave the majority of natural resources and industrial facilities to the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Army Cancels Meeting Over 'Lack of Progress'

AU2501132695 Paris AFP in English 1247 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 25 (AFP)—The Bosnian army, charging lack of progress in cementing a four-month truce, has refused to meet Serb officers here, a UN spokesman said Wednesday, describing just one of the difficulties awaiting the new UN Bosnia commander.

Officials from a five-nation "contact group" trying to get Bosnia peace negotiations on the rails again meanwhile ended their latest mission, acknowledging they had failed to win Serb backing for their plan.

UN military spokesman Gary Coward said senior officers from the mainly Moslem army were due to meet Thursday [26 January] at Sarajevo airport with Serb counterparts to discuss implementing a cessation of hostilities agreement signed under UN auspices December 31. But the session, a routine meeting of a central joint military commission, has been postponed until February 2, Coward said, adding that UN authorities did not know how long the Bosnian protest would last.

"UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) maintains that the lack of progress in many areas is the result of obstructions raised by both sides and that the primary means of resolving difficulties of this nature is through the medium of the regional joint commission," Coward argued.

The move by the army appeared to puzzle UN officials as several major difficulties had recently been overcome. [passage omitted]

Western diplomats hoping to take advantage of the respite in fighting to secure a resumption in peace negotiations are also encountering setbacks.

Officials from the group, representing Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, met with the Bosnian government on Tuesday and again on Wednesday morning. They were in Pale, the Bosnian Serb stronghold east of here, to confer with Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on Tuesday night.

But according to Alexey Zotov of Russia, "we don't yet have a clear answer from (the Serbs) that would enable us to start a negotiating process on the basis of the contact group peace plan." [passage omitted]

President Alija Izetbegovic said after meeting the group Wednesday that the Serbs should be given a two-month deadline "to answer yes or no."

UN Commander General Smith Arrives in Sarajevo

AU2601111395 Paris AFP in English 1016 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 26 (AFP)—General Rupert Smith of Britain arrived here Thursday to take command of some 23,000 UN peacekeepers in Bosnia-Hercegovina whose days in the country may be numbered.

Smith, a 51-year-old ex-paratrooper who replaced British compatriot General Michael Rose, was to see Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic later in the day.

In a skeletal arrival statement he said his mission would be "to give aid to the unfortunate people, the long-suffering people caught up in this conflict and on the basis of the cessation of hostilities agreement to work hard on arriving at a settlement for peace in this country."

Asked if he saw himself as a diplomat in uniform or as a facilitator for the delivery of humanitarian aid, he replied: "Both of those requirements fall within my mission, depending on the circumstances of the day." [passage omitted]

'Full Text' of Cease-Fire Protocol

LD2301183995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1703 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (SRNA)—The following is the full text of the Protocol on Implementing the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 31 January last year and the Agreement on the Freedom of Movement in the Area of Sarajevo of 17 March 1994. The Protocol was signed at Sarajevo Airport today by Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the Srpska republic, and Hasan Muratovic, minister for relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in the Muslim Government.

* * *

Confirming their commitment to maintaining the cessation of hostilities and their readiness to carry out obligations stemming from the agreements reached as a result of the mediation efforts by Mr. Jimmy Carter and the Agreement on the Complete Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December 1994, the sides are adopting the following protocol:

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1. The Roads in the Area of Sarajevo

a) The Sarajevo-Visoko Road as specified by the agreement of 17 March 1994

b) The crossing across the Bridge in Grbavica as specified by the agreement of 17 March 1994. With the aim of further liberalizing the freedom of movement the sides have agreed to increase the flow of movement across the bridge in Grbavica in both directions. A special commission will be set up to work out the details of the liberalization.

c) The Dobrinja-Butmir and Lukavica-Ilidza roads (via the airport) under the Agreement on the Freedom of Movement in the Area of Sarajevo the Dobrinja-Butmir and Lukavica-Ilidza roads are reserved for the transport of humanitarian goods organized by official international organizations. In order to improve the freedom of movement while the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities is in force, the sides have agreed to allow the use of the airport crossing to the following humanitarian organizations: Merhamet, Dobrotvor, La Benevolenzia, Caritas, and ADRA [expansion unknown] according to a special procedure and terms to be agreed upon directly by the two sides by 1 February 1995. The roads will open by 1 February 1995 at the latest. Civilian traffic will flow according to the provisions of the Agreement of the Freedom of Movement in the Area of Sarajevo of 17 March 1994. The checking of the humanitarian aid convoys will be carried out on the Butmir-Dobrinja and Ilidza-Lukavica roads jointly by three inspectors from each side in the presence of UN staff as observers. Any potential conflicts will be resolved by representatives from both sides with the assistance of UN representatives.

2. Free Choice of Place of Residence—Item 5 (the Carter Agreement)

Every citizen in every location controlled by either side is entitled, during the implementation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December, to change their place of residence and to safety guarantees. Both sides guarantee that they will not coerce citizens into changing their places of residence. UNPROFOR will assist in the course of changing one's place of residence in a transport, logistics, and safety sense. Citizens alone will submit a written request for the change of their place of residence, and the approval will be granted by competent authorities. Either side is entitled to demand, while the opposite side is duty-bound to endorse a request for the change of the place of residence by those citizens who state in writing that such a request was not endorsed at an earlier stage within a regular procedure. Those citizens who change their place of residence under this agreement and for whatever reasons insist on returning to their original place of residence (changing the decision) will be allowed to return under the same procedure. The sides will on a regular basis meet the international consultative committee, comprising UNPROFOR representatives (civilian affairs), UNHCR, and the UN Center for Human Rights, in order to deal with the cases on which the sides were unable to take any decision. The consultative committee will consider these cases and formulate its view. The sides can decide to involve the ICRC in the work of the consultative committee in the course of its mandate.

3. Prisoners of War

Both sides confirm their willingness to meet their obligation to exchange POW's and individuals arrested in connection with the war conflict, according to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December 1994, and to demand of the ICRC that it draw up a detailed plan by 31 January 1995. The sides are duty-bound to accept and implement the plan in a procedure as suggested by the ICRC.

4. Evacuation for Medical and Welfare Reasons

The sides agreed to carry out a medical and welfare-medical evacuation from Gorazde as soon as possible and by 31 January 1995 at the latest. This covers recorded medical cases listed by the authorities in Gorazde and welfare cases involving citizens of Serb nationality from Gorazde.

Final Provisions

This protocol is closely linked with the realization of the Agreement on the Complete Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December 1994 and represents an improvement on the Agreement on the Freedom of Movement of 17 March 1994.

The whole protocol is in force as long as the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December 1994 is in force. If the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 31 December 1994 is extended, this protocol is also extended.

Each side has the right to end the realization of the protocol if the other side fails to adhere to the agreements contained in this document and other signed documents.

The sides agreed to resume talks on the implementation of the Agreement on the Freedom of Movement of 17 March 1994.

The sides shall resume talks on joint economic activities in keeping with Article 7 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, and in this connection the extension of the right to use roads running across the airport.

Izetbegovic Demands Deadlines for Serbs

AU2501154995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Report by Nedzad Leko]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of the international Contact Group today held talks in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building for the second time in the last two days. The state delegation was led by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency. The delegation also included presidency members Ejup Ganic, Mirko Pejanovic, Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic, Ivo Komsic, Nijaz Durakovic, and Stjepan Kljuic, as well as Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic. Nedzad Leko has the report:

[Leko] After today's talks, journalists were first addressed by Aleksandr Zotov, the Russian representative in the Contact Group:

[Begin Zotov recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The Contact Group's visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina is aimed at finding a way to renew as soon as possible the peace negotiations on the basis of accepting the Contact Group's peace plan as a starting point. Here in Sarajevo we have heard the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government reiterating its position on its acceptance of the Contact Group's peace plan.

We have held exhaustive talks in Pale with the Srpska republic army in order to have a clear view on these issues. All this is aimed at starting negotiations that would lead to a comprehensive peace. We still do not have a clear answer from Pale that would enable us to start the negotiating process on the basis of the Contact Group's plan.

We welcome the acceptance of the peace plan by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. We will continue our efforts so that both sides accept the peace plan as a basis for negotiations and hope that the negotiating process will begin soon. We all feel the urgency of the moment. We are all aware of the danger if this opportunity for a peaceful settlement is missed. [end recording]

[Leko] Commenting on today's talks, President Izetbegovic said:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] Ambassador Zotov and his colleagues have briefed us on the course of yesterday's talks in Pale. We understand that they have invested a great deal of effort to convince the side in Pale to accept the Contact Group's plan as the basis for negotiations. We also understand that they did not receive this acceptance, that is, they did not receive both sides' (?consent). I must give credit to the Contact Group for remaining firm in this respect and for demanding from the other side to accept the plan as the condition for the continuation of talks.

The other side (?was left) to think about this proposal. So we were told. We said that this thinking cannot be unlimited. We demanded that fixed deadlines be set. We proposed that the Serbian side be given a period of two months to say yes or no to the plan. This is a very important issue and we have proposed to the Contact Group that a meeting of the Contact Group be held at ministerial level soon at which this would be confirmed. In other words, they would discuss two deadlines, two months to accept the plan, and in case the answer is positive, one month for negotiations to find a political solution.

Ambassador Zotov told me that they would continue their mission and we wish them success in this. So as not to make their job more difficult, we agreed that there should be no questions and answers today.

Finally, as regards some rumors that have recently been spread in our country that the United States has changed its position, the United States has assured us that this is not the case. This is also evident from Christopher's letter, which I received about three of four days ago. Despite this, the rumors continue to spread. We have decided that Dr. Silajdzic should travel to the United States and to clarify our and their position. It is understandable why we consider this very important. [end recording]

UNHCR Sends Aid Through Serb Territory

LD2501150995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1423 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zvornik, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] continued Wednesday, with full cooperation of the Bosnian Serb authorities, sending humanitarian aid to the Muslim enclaves.

Bosnian Serb military sources in Zvornik, east Bosnia, said free and safe passage across the territory of Bosnian Serbs has been secured for all UNHCR shipments starting from the neighboring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Muslim enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina—eastern Bosnia and Muslim-controlled Sarajevo sections.

Four trucks left Wednesday for the Muslim-controlled Sarajevo sections laden with solid fuels furnaces.

Eight trucks with 15 tonnes of food, hygiene supplies, footwear and clothing went to eastern Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica.

To the central Bosnian Muslim enclave of Zepa went a similar cargo, with food accounting most of the cargo—about 40 tonnes, said the Bosnian Serb sources in Zvornik.

Bosnian, Croatian Serbs Pledge To Fight Together

AU2601121895 Paris AFP in English 2110 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Jan 25 (AFP)—The Bosnian and Croatian Serbs warned Wednesday they would join forces in a common defence strategy if Croatia attacked the breakaway Croatian Serb republic of Krajina, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said.

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Milan Martic and Radovan Karadzic, the "presidents" of the Serbs' unilaterally declared Croatian and Bosnian republics, issued the warning after a meeting in the Bosnian Serb "capital" Pale near Sarajevo, SRNA said in a dispatch monitored here. [passage omitted]

In their joint statement, Martic and Karadzic said: "The Serb Republic and the Serb Republic of Krajina will defend themselves together.

"We are threatening no one, but we will do everything to safeguard the sovereignty of the Serb Republic of Krajina."

The statement cited a previous joint defence agreement between the two territories issued in 1992 during a joint session of the two Serb republics' "parliaments" at Prijedor in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. Karadzic also appealed to the international community to lean on Croatia not to carry out its threat to retake Krajina by force.

And hinting that Serbia itself might join the fray if Krajina were attacked, Karadzic told the agency that he doubted that the whole of the Serbian people would remain indifferent in such an eventuality. "That's where we think there is a danger of a large scale war in the Balkans," Karadzic warned.

Ninkovic Says Army 'Undergoing Reorganization'

LD2501212595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2039 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 25 Jan (SRNA)—Milan Ninkovic, defense minister of the Srpska republic said today that "the Srpska republic army is currently undergoing reorganization aimed at creating a professional nucleus."

In a statement for Serb Radio Teslic, Ninkovic said that in future recruits would be spending 15 days in their units, followed by the same period of time in compulsory work brigades.

Ninkovic stressed that the Defense Ministry's activities were oriented toward strengthening the specific purpose industry by relying on its own resources.

Muslims Propose Solution to Sandzak Problem

AU2501200095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim National Council of Sandzak in a statement issued today points out two alternatives for a democratic and civilized resolution to the Sandzak problem in the so-called Yugoslavia.

The first one is that the Bosniak-Muslims be included in the Constitution as a people, and in this sense be granted the rights envisaged by international documents. After this, along with international guarantees, they should start negotiations with the Muslim National Council of Sandzak in order to undertake concrete steps to establish a special status for Sandzak.

The second alternative is to immediately commence bilateral talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina on the problem of Sandzak and find a solution for the Serbs in Bosnia, as well as the Bosniaks in Serbia on a reciprocal basis.

The most functional solution would be to do this within the already existing peace conference on the former Yugoslavia, since a special commission for Sandzak already exists at the conference, the statement of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak says.

'More Than 5,000' Croats Flee Tuzla Area

LD2501213895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1443 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—More than 5,000 Croats have moved out from the municipalities of Tuzla, Lukavac, Zivinice and Banovici in northeastern Bosnia under pressure from the Muslim authorities, the Croat Radio of Herceg-Bosna reported on wednesday.

The radio said that the fact that more than 50 percent of the overall Croat population from that territory (according to the 1991 census) moved out had 'assumed proportions of a real exodus.' This was especially so after the signing of the Washington Agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The U.S.-sponsored agreement was signed in March 1994, following one year of fierce Muslim-Croat fighting.

Under the Washington agreement, the Muslim-Croat Federation would subsequently enter confederation with neighbouring Croatia. Croat radio of Herceg-Bosnia reported that due to the difficult position in the newly-formed Muslim-controlled Tuzla-Podrinje (the Drina River valley) Canton, a Tuzla delegation of the Croatian Democratic Union asked for assistance and protection from the party's president for Bosnia-Herzegovina Dario Kordic in Mostar on Tuesday.

The radio reported that the talks in Mostar dwelled on the exodus followed mobilization into the Muslim Army of Croats of military age, the ban on holding classes in the Croatian language and on forming new Croat municipalities.

Croatia Serbs, Abdic Forces Launch Attack

AU2601121595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 0330 today, Bihac and the other towns in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina have

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been exposed to strong artillery and tank attacks by the united aggressor from the area of the so-called Serbian Krajina, from the areas of Zeljava and Licko Petrovo Selo. Several missiles landed in the center of Bihac, causing new considerable material damage, and inflicting serious injuries to several civilians. The tanks, howitzers, and mortars are also targeting the Bihac villages of (?Papalj), (?Jasika), [words indistinct].

There is no peace on the Velika Kladusa front either. The enemy forces are attacking along the entire front line. On top of the artillery attacks, they have also attempted several infantry breakthroughs but the fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps have successfully repulsed them. Significant movement of enemy army and military hardware has been registered in the areas of the UN Protection Areas in the so-called Serbian Krajina.

The other fronts around Bosanska Krupa, Bosanska Otoka, the Grmusa-Srbljani Plateau, and the Grabez heights have also not been quiet. The situation on these fronts has been marked by the aggressor's provocations with snipers and small arms fire.

As we are filing this report, the Bihac area is still under enemy shelling from the UN Protected Areas in the so-called Serbian Krajina.

5th Corps Commander Clarifies Situation in Bihac

AU2501164495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mulic] We asked Brigadier Mirsad Firmanovic, head of the 5th Corps Headquarters, to clarify the current situation in the Bihac region.

[Firmanovic] The situation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps theater of operations is becoming more complex with each passing hour. Actually, what we have here are (?synchronized) attacks of the Serbo-chetnik aggressor and Fikret Abdic's forces in the Zeljava-Bihac direction that are moving from the area of Velika Kladusa toward Vrlovrat and from Velika Kladusa toward Pecingrad. We are restraining ourselves from responding adequately and are observing the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement. However, we will see how long this can go on. It depends on the intensity of their offensive operations.

We are attempting to absorb the attacks in order to contribute to the implementation of the agreement in the 5th Corps theater of operations. We will, however, see how long we will be able to restrain ourselves from responding adequately. This depends on the concrete situation on the ground.

[Mulic] Velika Kladusa is the biggest problem. What is the situation there?

[Firmanovic] Well, it seems that we shall have to solve all the problems militarily since there is no goodwill on the other side to reach a solution peacefully, through political means. It seems that everyone wants to wage a war, so we shall have to solve it militarily. However, there is still time to somehow absorb this, for the situation to settle, and for a solution to be reached through political means. To what extent this will be observed, to what extent will goodwill be exhibited remains to be seen.

[Mulic] Are Martic's chetniks still in several areas of the Bihac region?

[Firmanovic] Yes, in fact, increasingly so. They are increasingly cooperating with Fikret's units—that is, the two forces are mixed, we treat them as one and the same, since Abdic's forces too have come from the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina. They are particularly using heavy weaponry on an everyday basis, and so forth.

More on Government Attack in West Bosnia

LD2501200995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1921 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Muslim Government Army 5th corps on Wednesday launched a strong artillery-backed infantry attack on the positions of the west Bosnia troops.

Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA said the attack was carried out in the region of Johovica and Velika Kladusa, the centre of the autonomous province of west Bosnia, inflicting casualties on both sides.

SRNA quoted the west Bosnia Radio Velkaton of Velika Kladusa as saying that the attack started after the 5th Corps Commander Atif Dudakovic had threatened to 'enter Velika Kladusa in 15 days and seize Serb lands toward (the northern Bosnian town of) Banja Luka.'

On the basis of the results of a referendum in north-western Bosnia, local moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic proclaimed, in September 1993, the autonomous province of west Bosnia, rejecting the Bosnian Muslim Government policy on the Bosnian civil war.

Abdic's followers resisted attacks by the Bosnian Muslim Government Army 5th corps until August 1994, when they were defeated and forced to flee to neighboring Serb Krajina. Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution.

Intra-Muslim fighting resumed in early November 1994, when west Bosnia troops launched an offensive to regain the territories lost to the 5th Corps.

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Serbs Violate Cease-Fire in Gorazde, Srebrenica

AU2501155895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There has been no peace on the Bosnia-Herzegovina fronts in the last 24 hours. The Serbian-Montenegrin and Karadzic's chetniks have violated the latest cease-fire agreement on the Gorazde, Brcko, and Srebrenica fronts, as well as in the theater of operations of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Corps. [passage omitted]

On the Gorazde front, the enemy opened fire from automatic weapons in the Hrid region and attacked Radici with snipers.

In the 4th Corps theater of operations, especially on the Konjic front, the chetniks on several occasions fired small arms from their positions in Rankovac and Bukova Glava. The aggressor fired mortar projectiles on the area around (?Zajici). Unlike the past few days, the intensity of enemy attacks in the southern part of the 4th Corps theater of operations has subsided, although the chetniks continued provocations with small arms.

The latest cease-fire has also been violated in the Srebrenica protected area. [passage omitted]

On the fronts in the 2d Corps theater of operations, the aggressor fired 82-mm mortars from the Ciganiste area on Lukavica, Rijeka, and Kokosnica. One civilian was killed and one seriously wounded. Our positions came under strong fire from the direction of Kriz and Potocari.

On the Posavina front, the enemy tried to infiltrate subversive groups, but our fighters spotted them in time and pushed them back to their original positions.

As many as 41 helicopter flights were registered between Sekovici and Stolice yesterday. [passage omitted]

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RSK's Babic: Tudjman's Threats 'Very Serious'

LD2501215395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2039 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 25 Jan (SRNA)—Milan Babic, foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], assessed as very serious the threats by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, carried in DER SPIEGEL, that "Croatia will reintegrate Krajina into its legal and constitutional system by force."

"The Croatian leadership keeps repeating its false formula about some reintegration of the RSK into Croatia, as if the RSK had ever been integrated into Croatia and not into Yugoslavia, which Croatia left," said Babic in a statement for SRNA today.

Stressing that the RSK, if a need arises, would defend itself with all available means, Babic said that the Serbian side would continue to publicly advocate before the international public its stand on the irrefutable right to self-determination and a desire to resolve all conflicts peacefully.

"However, one should be extremely careful and always bear in mind that Croatia will never be satisfied with some sort of reintegration of the RSK because its ultimate claims are linked with access to the River Drina," warned Babic. In his words, if Tudjman tries to realize his bellicose threats after 31 March, Serbia and Yugoslavia will intervene, as regulated by the Vance plan.

"I am convinced that Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will always help their brothers west of the Drina, and I cannot believe in any other option if indeed Tudjman adopts a war option," warned the RSK foreign minister.

Granic Hints at Possible Talks on UN Role

LD2501152695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 25 January broadcasts a recorded excerpt of Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic's address at a session of the Croatian parliament's Chamber of Deputies in connection with the ending of UN Protection Force's mandate in Croatia on 31 March 1995. Granic says:

"The implementation of relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on full reintegration, including political reintegration of the Serb-occupied areas, is the basic criteria by which Croatia will continue to be guided, both as regards Knin and Belgrade or New York, or any other capital serving as the heaquarters of some international organization. To this end, and to this end alone, Croatia remains willing—if in the meantime, before 31 March, talks with the local Serbs produce the appropriate positive results—to begin talks on the future role of the world community in establishing international mechanisms designed to facilitate the supervision of agreements, and in setting up appropriate, requisite instruments to strengthen trust."

Granic Addresses Parliament on UN Mandate

LD2501174095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] In his speech, in which he stressed Croatia's orientation toward a lasting and stable peace on several occasions, Dr. Mate Granic analyzed the circumstances that led to Croatia's decision to cancel the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate. We wanted, Dr. Granic said, to receive the world's support in three key ways:

[Begin Granic recording, in progress] ...the UNPA [UN Protected Areas], or rather the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia, will be considered to be an internal matter for the Republic of Croatia. Second, the true and basic aim of this decision being to dynamize the negotiating process, 31 March 1995 was established as a clearly specified deadline. Third, the decision was not aimed at opening a path to the war option, but at the same time, there can be no negotiations on changing this decision. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Dr. Granic said the international community was exerting pressure on Croatia but no one was disputing our sovereign right to adopt such decisions.

[Begin Granic recording] ...we fully understand the concern of international institutions and factors, and especially our friends and allies, but I would like to send all of them word from this place: Croatia has sufficient experience and state and political maturity to solve its problems on its own and without regard to some sequence of moves advocated by people outside. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Croatia, Dr. Granic said, will continue to ensure that Serbs in Croatia obtained:

[Begin Granic recording] ...cultural autonomy and the highest level of local autonomy in those municipalities in which the Serbs were in the majority before the war; full respect for human rights and the rights of the Serb ethnic community, which could be checked on by representatives of the international community; incorporation into the state and social system through reconstruction and development. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Officials Meet Silajdzic at Zagreb Airport

LD2501191995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador to the United Nations; Bosiljko Misetic, the president's special adviser for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Confederation; and Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met late this afternoon at Zagreb's Pleso Airport. Mirjana Rakela reports on their talks.

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[Begin recording] [Rakela] The talks with Prime Minister Silajdzic were unofficial but extremely useful, Miomir Zuzul, Croatia's ambassador to the United Nations, said. The reason for the meeting was Silajdzic's trip to Washington and Brussels. Here is what Mr Miomir Zuzul told us after the closed-door meeting at Pleso Airport:

[Zuzul] We primarily exchanged opinions and ideas on how to accelerate work on the development of the Federation, but we also discussed fresh initiatives within the Contact Group; unfortunately, no one can be happy with this, neither the Bosnians nor Bosnia, Herzegovina Croats, Croatia, and the world, with the fact that no solutions leading to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being found.

We discussed the situation created by the cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate by the Republic of Croatia and the situation following the expiration of the four-month cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I somehow feel that we mutually wish to find a way to consult each other and cooperate in the search for such a solution, while being aware of the problems Mr. Misetic could probably tell us more about. We concluded that it would be good to launch an initiative to the United States, which we believe will be received well, to try to convene some kind of trilateral meeting between the United States, the Republic of Croatia, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, to discuss all open questions on the basis of the Washington Agreements and the Vienna Constitution, and find ways to speed up the development of the Federation.

[Rakela] Bosiljko Misetic also assessed the talks as being extremely useful, and added:

[Misetic] Croatia should make a point of demonstrating good will; we have shown again that political willingness is there, that our political stance is that the federation is a political optimum for Croatia. For their part, the Muslims will have to realize that, if they want their sovereignty and their state, the alliance with the Croats is a necessity. [end recording]

RSK Prime Minister on Accord With Zagreb

LD2501192995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1856 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—Republic of Serb Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic on Wednesday said Krajina had practically met all its duties stemming from the Dec. 2 economic accord with Croatia.

Mikelic on Wednesday informed international mediators Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg that the Adriatic oil pipeline had been put into an operational state and was ready for deliveries.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's cabinet said that the northern branch of the pipeline, which partly crosses the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA), had been opened for expoitation on Wednesday. The Adriatic oil pipeline was closed in the summer of 1991, after an outbreak of fighting between local Serbs and Croats.

Krajina Serbs proclaimed their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, after Croatia unilaterally seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation and removed Serb national rights from its Constitution. Krajina's territory was in March 1992 placed under U.N. protection and U.N. peacekeepers were deployed with a mandate to keep at bay the two confronted sides until they reached a negotiated solution.

Mikelic said the republic of Serb Krajina expected Owen and Stoltenberg to invest maximum efforts in the U.N. Security Council because the presence of U.N. peacekeepers was essential for further talks on other disputed questions between Croatia and Krajina.

On Jan. 12, Tudjman informed the U.N. that Croatia planned to deny further hospitality to its peacekeepers after the expiry of their six-month mandate on March 31. Tudjman's cabinet said in a statement that oil would on Thursday flow from Omisalj on the northern Adriatic island of Krk to Sisak, 60 km southeast of Zagreb, and further north to Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The cabinet said measures had also been taken for opening railway lines between the Croatian and Yugoslav capitals of Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as the Zagreb-Split line via Knin, the political center of the republic of Serb Krajina. The statement said preparations were also under way for opening water supply and electricity systems.

Mikelic said the water pipeline between the towns of Petrinja and Sisak, southeast of Zagreb, would be put into operation in the next ten days, while works on the Brinje-Mraclin electricity supply line near the Croatian capital would be completed in the next four weeks.

Serb Convoy Uses Belgrade-Zagreb Highway

LD2501222595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2145 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Okucani, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—The first goods convoy from east to west Slavonija, two parts of the republic of Serb Krajina, passed along the Croatian part of the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway on Wednesday.

The highway was opened to traffic under an article of the economic agreement signed between Serb Krajina and Croatia late last year. The highway was once one of the main links between Europe's southeast and northwest. It

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was closed since 1991, when Croatia fought a war for secession from the former Yugoslav federation.

In answer to Croatia's secession, Serbs formed their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in parts where they were the majority population. Croatia does not recognize Serb Krajina.

The economic agreement ended the second of the planned three phases in the normalization of Croatia-Krajina relations. The first phase was completed in March last year with the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The third phase should be an agreement on a political settlement to the crisis.

The 20-lorry convoy crossed the 150 km-long sector in three and a half hours, undergoing detailed checks by Croatian police units. The Belgrade-Zagreb Highway passes through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Oil Pipeline Through Serb-Held Areas To Open

LD2501152995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin this broadcast with a statement from the office of the president of the Republic:

Following an agreement on 2 December 1994, and after inspections and the requisite preparatory work, today, 25 January 1995, the northern section of the Adriatic oil pipeline, one part of which runs through the UN Protected Area [UNPA], Sector North, is being brought into operation.

Tomorrow, 26 January, at 1000, oil will begin to flow through the pipeline from Omisalj to Sisak, and on toward the central European countries of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

The opening of the Adriatic oil pipeline, after the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway, and preparations already undertaken to open up the Zagreb-Belgrade railway and the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway line, and the water supply and electricity distribution systems, confirms that the normalization of relations and the peaceful reintegration of the UNPA areas is in full swing.

Croatian Serbs To Found New Party in Zagreb

LD2501183395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1541 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 25 Jan (TANJUG)—A new party rallying [Croatian] Serbs, the Independent Serb Party [Samostalna Srpska Stranka], will be founded in Zagreb on 29 January, party founder Milorad Pupovac said today.

He said at a news conference that the party will be promoting a program for the survival of Serbs in Croatia and the preservation of their national identity.

According to Pupovac, the party will be advocating a policy of national accord between the Serbs and Croats. [passage omitted]

Bobetko: HV Ready To Regain 'All' Territories

95BA0089B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24-26 Dec 94 p 5

[Article by Zeljko Buksa: "All of Croatia Free in 1995!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The fate of the Croatian people has been placed in your hands today, and you will have to write Croatian history," the chief of the General Staff told the participants in the course.*

Zagreb—On Friday, at the Petar Zrinski Croatian Military Academy, the graduation of the fourth class from the Officers' School, the highest command school for active and reserve Croatian Army officers, was formally celebrated.

To start with, Brigadier General Veselko Gabricevic, deputy commander of the Croatian Military Academy, emphasized that the average grade of that class was 4.55, which means that the average performance was excellent, and that for the first time the members of the fourth class had also carried out a staff military exercise. Then Colonel Marian Rihter, representing General Blaskic, chief of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] General Staff, expressed gratitude for the assistance in training numerous HVO officers and noncommissioned officers.

The chief of the Croatian Army's General Staff, Corps General Janko Bobetko, said that this was one of the best classes to date at the Croatian Military Academy. Commenting that with every class completed the Croatian Army was becoming stronger and stronger and better able to carry out its most important task—freeing even the last occupied part of the Republic of Croatia—General Bobetko emphasized that the HV was capable of carrying out its national task.

"Because a capable army," he said, "makes political negotiations easier, our enemies are constantly gathering information about our strength.

"In 1995 we have to reach all the borders of our homeland, since a few days ago President Tudjman also said that Croatia would terminate the UN Protection Forces on 10 January if it did not fulfill its mission. That means that in that case, we will take our fate into our own hands. The fate of the Croatian people has also been placed in your hands, and you will have to write Croatian history," the chief of the General Staff told the members of the class.

He warned them that in a well-trained army with a high degree of national awareness like the Croatian Army, there would always be many fewer casualties even in the fiercest battles than in other armies. "Consequently," General Bobetko added, "your role in training soldiers is particularly important." He also told the members of the

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fourth class to graduate from the Officers' School that they had to achieve the trust of those whom they commanded, based on their personal example and maximum concern for people.

At the end of the ceremony, General Bobetko presented awards and decorations to the best members of the class. The best one in the class, Captain Tihomir Kundid, thanked the chief of the General Staff and the instructors at the Croatian Military Academy on their behalf.

Damage to Dubrovnik Airport Reported

95BA0089A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 94 p 5

[Unattributed HINA article: "DM48 Million in War Damage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dubrovnik—Dubrovnik's Cilipe airport, which is particularly important because of the Dubrovnik region's great distance and lack of transportation links with the rest of Croatia and with Europe, suffered 48 million German marks [DM] in war damage during the war. It now has 370 employees and more than DM1 million in debt incurred during the war, we have learned from the Dubrovnik airport's director, Tonci Peovic.

The aggressor dismantled 14 X-ray instruments for heavy baggage and four for personal luggage, all the backup power supply devices, the telephone switchboard, radio equipment, and sanitation and firefighting equipment, among which, for example, just one fire engine is worth DM600,000 to DM1.4 million. Just the stolen approach instruments and instrument landing instruments, and the equipment for route overflights and tower equipment, are worth an additional DM10 million. The estimated damages from the destruction of the infrastructure and the theft of all the equipment amount to DM59 million.

In 1990, the Dubrovnik airport handled 1,200,000 passengers and 500 metric tons of goods in traffic. Last year 37,000 passengers landed in Dubrovnik, the same as in 1962, when the airport had just opened. It is assumed that this year the number of passengers will increase to 72,000, although 30 percent more passengers were planned, the Dubrovnik airport director emphasized. He said that the shelling had halted Adria Airways flights and considerably reduced tourist and passenger traffic.

Next year the reception of 300,000 passengers is planned. The data from previous years indicate that as many as 62 percent of tourists arrived in Dubrovnik by air, and consequently that airport really deserves the title of the "reception room" for Dubrovnik tourism. That is the reason why all the damage that took place during the bombardment has been temporarily repaired. So far about DM6 million in credit funds obtained from HKBO [expansion unknown] has been spent on rebuilding, and the equipment donated by the Zagreb and Split airports, along with Salzburg, Innsbruck, Vienna, and Graz amount to DM10 million. This includes mostly already used equipment, generators, fire engines, and luggage elevators, while the biggest undertaking so far has been carried out in the construction part of rebuilding the terminal building.

Of the 370 workers employed in 1991, through buyouts and crosstraining, that number has now been reduced to 312, and will be gradually reduced to the optimum figure of 250 employees. Currently 82 employees are working at the airport, and the rest are on the waiting list.

Difficulties in Croatian Assembly Viewed

95BA0081D Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 94 pp 26-27

[Article by Drago Hedl: "Seks Is Practicing Severity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The atmosphere in the Croatian parliament is such that everything smacks of early elections, and the very question of an assessment at the top of whether they should be called or not is still being left to Vladimir Seks, vice president of the parliament, who at any moment, when he frowns on the opposition, can practice severity and adjourn the meeting "because of disorder in the chamber."

If the live television broadcast of the marathon sessions of the Croatian parliament was until recently one of the most boring things in the already murderous programming of HTV [Croatian Television], now that Stjepan Mesic and Josip Manolic left the ranks of the incumbent HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], things have changed for the better. Those Croatian citizens who could watch the programming of TV Serbia because they are close to the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders no longer need to be embarrassed that the Croatian parliament, compared to the Serbian (or federal) parliament, is a boring and uninteresting place where they talk nonsense. The departure of Mesic and Manolic, that is, took away from the advantage of the HDZ in the benches of the parliament, which until recently had been beyond question, so if those two men who had been important figures in the Croatian incumbent party have not entirely succeeded in their intention to take away a sufficient number of deputies from the HDZ for the Croatian Independent Democrats (HND) to deprive Tudjman's party of its parliamentary majority, the cases are more and more frequent (the debate on thievery in the transformation, the Croatian behavior concerning Bihac, the mandate of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]) when some of the HDZ deputies go over to the side of the opposition in the debate and in the voting.

The Carrot and the Stick

Dr. Nedeljko Mihanovic, who addresses most opposition deputies as "fellow deputy" without recognizing the legality of his election, is absolutely not up to conducting sessions of the parliament, so that, as someone wittily

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concluded, every time there is any serious item on the agenda, he gets a call from some state protocol office requiring him to go to meet someone or see someone off. Vladimir Seks, the top "cleanup man" in the HDZ, who, it seems more and more, left the position of deputy prime minister precisely in order to "restore order" in the parliament, then does what Mihanovic obviously is unable to do.

The episode in which the parliamentary deputies were walking around the parliament building on St. Mark's Square carrying the faxed text of the agreement between Zagreb and Knin published a day earlier by BORBA of Belgrade, informing one another than Hrvoje Sarinic would the next day be signing it with Bora Mikelic, is probably an event which so far has done the most to humiliate the deputies of the "sacred Croatian parliament." This event, thanks to Seks's arrogant decision to adjourn the session of the parliament and postpone its resumption for a few days later—that is, at a time when Sarinic was all ready to sign the agreement on "economic matters" with Martic's unrecognized Krajina—was a still more serious blow to the parliament than the one it received in late summer when it adopted the decision about the 100 provisional days of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, and then just a few days later the UN Security Council extended that same mandate of the protective forces for another six months.

The Croatian Supreme Command, which, even when the HDZ majority in the parliament was more than overwhelming, had no particular inclination to give the parliament any very serious role in the political life of the state, at this point, in somewhat altered circumstances, seems to have begun to deal with the parliamentary deputies on the basis of the "carrot and the stick." At just about the same time that Seks restored order and adjourned the session of the parliament "of one of the oldest European peoples" in a manner unprecedented, all the deputies received doubled salaries, which were already substantial. That is, no one knows how it was possible, but somehow legally it has already been fixed, the parliamentary deputies, while they received a 100-percent salary increase, also received two-year "arrears" of the compensation for hot meals (on the average about 2,000 German marks [DM]!). That "carrot" was supposed to have two effects: to let the deputies know that it was better for them to "enjoy the fruits of their labor" to the end of their term and not to rush into early elections, "turning a silk purse into a sow's ear," and also to behave in a accordance with this fact, not insisting on such trifles as examining the texts of agreements.

Erosion of the HDZ

The proponent of this kind of ingratiation of the parliamentary deputies obviously overestimated, because the deputies, it is true, did accept the "carrot" that was offered (we are all only human, after all), but they also stuck to their old behavior. And then the social pot boiled over on the other side. First came the strike of personnel of Croatia Airlines, the Croatian air carrier, and then the problem came down from the sky to the earth: Locomotives came to a stop even on those few Croatian rail lines where trains were still running. And while the case with the pilots was solved relatively quickly (there are not so many of them, so that the money has already been found somehow), the railroad people are on strike for the fourth day now as this article is being written. It could not have happened at a less convenient time for Prime Minister Nikica Valentic: at the time when the government is presenting the state budget for 1995 to the public. Although the budget represents an enormous sum, there will not be enough money to cover an immense portion of the requests, among them a very large item for the Croatian Railroads. Meanwhile, how is it possible to negotiate with the rail unions and win them over to renouncing their demands for higher pay (on the classical grounds that there is no money, because the poor state must allocate most of what it has for defense), when at the same time, on the basis of that same calculation, the pay of the deputies has been doubled and, of course, that of the country's political leadership as well?

Conciliation of the deputies thus proved ineffective, and the only remaining possibility was the "stick" in Seks's hands. But even here the possibilities are slim: The opposition has now seen through that trick, and so now, when it is dissatisfied, it does not leave the parliament, as it did in the early summer, unthinkingly as it now appears. Now, the opposition's tactics are different: to slowly erode the HDZ majority by winning over those deputies whose "party discipline" has greatly relaxed, and irritate the HDZ as much as possible so that now it will be the one that will adjourn the session when it finds itself in trouble. So, heated new scenes in the Croatian parliament are not only possible—they could become a constant element.

Whether or not the disobedience in the Croatian parliament, which is now so irritating Vladimir Seks that in spite of the weakened Mihanovic he is more and more taking over the president's parliamentary powers, nevertheless results in early elections could become clearer in the very next extraordinary session, which is scheduled for the end of the month. At that time, the agenda will include the state budget running to enormous amounts, which, however, do not come close to satisfying the hunger of many beneficiaries of the budget. It is not only the Valentic government that will be put to the test—adoption of the budget will be a question of its survival—but also the disposition of the parliament, especially that portion of HDZ deputies, who, dissatisfied, are showing an ever greater aversion to a policy of "it is taken care of." If it is not going to be easy for the opposition, it is not going to be simple for Seks either, and so his "sparring," as an introduction to early elections, is being followed with particular attention.

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Serbian Opposition Leader Fosters Relations

AU2501114295 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 21 Jan 95 p 15

[Interview with Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, by Ljube Profiloski, in Skopje; date not given: "The Men in Power Forgot About Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Profiloski] You return to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] one and a half years after your last visit. What are your present impressions of the overall situation in our country?

[Djindjic] My impression is that the political situation in Macedonia is now much more stable. The parliament of 1993 was far more unstable than it is now. I am sorry that not all the parties participated in the last elections, but I still think that the political and institutional situation is far more stable. This authority will have numerous tasks in completing the institutional constitution of the state and now it cannot say that it has been blocked by the other parties and it will be able to work and make decisions according to its own program and abilities. It can now more easily make system decisions on the economy and legal management, as well as on many other items. I also think that relations between Serbia and Macedonia have been furthered this year, actions are more efficient, healing, calm, there are fewer tensions and greater possibilities for a dialogue, and I think that this is the right moment to move toward an intensification of relations hitherto dramatically interrupted.

[Profiloski] On whose initiative are you paying this visit and what do you expect from it?

[Djindjic] We are guests of the Macedonian parliament. It is not by accident that we are here. I have paid several transit visits to Macedonia in which I had contacts with a number of representatives of the former Macedonian Government, and I have also had some private contacts with the president of the Republic of Macedonia. This meeting is a result of our cooperation over the past year, and it is fully directed toward the promotion of relations between our two states. There is no party character to this visit, there is nothing selfish or egoistic, it is simply a patriotic wish of the Macedonian and our side to remove the political blockade that was unilaterally forced by our Serbian side. The situation in Serbia is such that we are a party with international credibility, we did not participate in those ugly scenes in 1992, we do not have the traces of communism that can be found in the ruling party that was in power also during the past 50 years. Today we are the most suitable party that can draw Serbia out from international isolation and that can help in discreet international contacts.

Disability of the Power

[Profiloski] Your party is taking the first steps toward a closer cooperation between Macedonia and Serbia. In your opinion, what are the reasons for the present cold relations between the two states? Particularly if we know that Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic that left former Yugoslavia in a peaceful way and that it was only in Macedonia that the Yugoslav National Army did not fire a shot.

[Djindjic] I think that the reason for this is the extremely lazy policy of Serbia and Yugoslavia and the leadership's inability to tackle questions that are not of an urgent nature. Our power dedicates the greatest time to unimportant problems. It dedicates greater attention to its relations with Slovenia than with Macedonia. It acts as a fireman that places security systems where there is no fire instead of taking preventive measures. They wake up only when the alarm bells ring. Relations with Macedonia were handicapped only because there had not been any problems between us. The people in power simply forgot about Macedonia. They dealt only with the essential economic and transport cooperation, while the other part, the political, which was not essential, was totally forgotten. I would not say that it was due to bad intentions, but simply due to incapability. Since I know those people personally, I do not think that they had any bad intentions. However, I also think that they are not capable of political planning and political visions, that is, that Macedonia will be much more important than Slovenia in five to six years, and that due to its geographical position, it is of a vital interest for Serbia. If we invest in good relations with Macedonia, we shall be awarded in many spheres. Nevertheless, this is not the way they think.

[Profiloski] From time to time there are some tensions on the border and they leave the impression in Macedonia that Serbia still has some hidden intentions in relation to Macedonia and that it will show them at an appropriate time. Fear was aroused from the refrained attitude of Serbia.

[Djindjic] These were nothing but fireworks with the aim of intensifying tensions, by which they wanted to demonstrate that they can fire from heavy arms if they wish. However, it was only meant for the media with the aim of distracting the people's attention from the economic and political crises. There is nobody in Serbia that seriously looks at Macedonia as at a critical region. We are preoccupied with Kosovo, with the Serbian Republic, with the Krajinas, and so no normal person can wish to destabilize the situation in Macedonia. I do not think that there are any such people in the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia. And if there are, there are only some unserious members of the opposition that are hooked by the media's provocations and that are trying to connect them to those in power and to profit thereby.

Why then does the present authority in Serbia not recognize Macedonia? Is it really because of solidarity with Greece?

[Djindjic] I think that the right occasion was missed at the first moment when Macedonia was being constituted

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as a state, and with the passage of time this question has become more and more difficult and a more serious reason for this step became necessary. The mistake was made when Macedonia was not recognized just after its independence. The Greeks would have been a bit angry then, but little by little the dust would have settled as happened when all the other states recognized Macedonia. It is now much more difficult, because now relations are tough between Skopje and Athens and Skopje and Belgrade, but some promises have been made at state level for which we do not know anything.

Media Coverage

[Profiloski] What was the reason behind Milosevic's idea on the creation of a Balkan federation of Greece, Serbia, and Macedonia?

[Djindjic] In my opinion, it was an action to cover the visit and the peacemaking mission of Jimmy Carter to Pale. It has nothing to do with either Greece or Macedonia, but it is an idea with a grandiose intent with the aim of covering Carter's visit to Bosnia and of pushing it from the first pages of the world's media.

[Profiloski] Do you believe that peace will soon come to Bosnia?

[Djindjic] Yes, I do. If I did not, I would not be involved in politics. I believe that 1995 will be the year of peace. Either there will be a complete peace, or the implementation of the peace plan will start again.

[Profiloski] Your party is opposed to Serbia's blockade against the Bosnian Serbs. You are on the side of Radovan Karadzic. Do you think that this will work toward peace in Bosnia?

[Djindjic] Yes! We believed that the situation in Bosnia and in the Serbian Republic was very critical and dangerous at that time. There was a strong nationalist feeling there that was like a kamikaze attitude. If an army of 100,000 soldiers that is well organized and armed decides to fight against the rest of the world, it is very dangerous. We did not see isolation as serving the imposition of the peace plan, we were firmly convinced that it was another matter and we believed that the Army in the Serbian Republic was ready to fight to the last man only to have to accept what was then offered to it.

[Profiloski] What is the present relationship between the authorities in Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs?

[Djindjic] There are no relations at all. The authority in Serbia is very angry with the Bosnian Serbs for having refused to be Milosevic's pawns.

[Profiloski] What are your relations with the Bosnian Serbs and with Radovan Karadzic personally?

[Djindjic] Relatively good. From the beginning of the Bosnian crisis we were committed to its solution by political means, but we also determined that the Serbs should be able to speak about the state in which they want to live through their own representatives.

Without Territorial Pretensions

[Profiloski] In your opinion, what is the most suitable solution for the Serbian national interests?

[Djindjic] As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, I think that the best solution for the Serbs would be to have a union of two independent states—Srpska republic and Muslim-Croat Federation. They should make a territorial division and find a way for mutual coexistence, they should have good relations with their neighbors, but this does not necessarily mean that they should unite with them. I think that this will soon heal the wounds of the war. The same goes for the Krajinas in Croatia. First, a solution for all the economic and transport problems and freezing the political problems at this stage. At least for a period of three to four years. The reason is because neither the one nor the other side is prepared for a compromise concerning the political questions. Our party has never shown to aspire to unrealistic goals and we should never behave as if we were alone in the world and isolated from the international community. I think that we should put no more strain on the chain, there has been enough of wars and sufferings, and there has been enough of this national interest. In the next phase the state's prosperity should be treated as a national interest. It means that we should construct a modern, cultural, and educated state. This is our next national interest. As far as the territories are concerned, we should no longer insist on that, because it is a Pandora's box, and once opened, a lot can come out.

[Profiloski] Will the Democratic Party give up the idea of a Greater Serbia if it comes to power?

[Djindjic] I think that the idea of a Greater Serbia was invented and pushed by the Socialist Party of Serbia. However, I am sure that if tomorrow the Security Council were to make an offer to Serbia to unite with the Srpska republic it would refuse. This idea is no longer current. Our party is committed to the right of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to sovereignty the way it defines it. It means a Serbian Republic as a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If they are satisfied with this, we are satisfied, too. In our opinion, it must not necessarily be an integral part of Serbia. Greater Serbia has never existed as an idea in our party.

[Profiloski] How much longer can Serbia endure the economic sanctions and how much help can Dragoslav Avramovic's program be in this?

[Djindjic] Serbia would have endured much longer if it had a good government and organization. Our worst sanction is the poor management of the authorities. Of the bad situation 30 percent is down to the sanctions, 70 percent to bad management and organization. It has destroyed natural resources, it has sold them to the world. Several billion dollars have been stolen from the

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population by means of various private banks and inflation. It is because of the corrupt and incapable authority, and not the sanctions. The program of Dragoslav Avramovic is not one that will make the economy, the management, or the banks efficient. It is nothing but a time-out in the present crisis.

Militant Wing of VMRO-DPMNE

95BA0049A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 5 Nov 94 p 16

[Article by Zoran Petrov: "Militaristic Fashion and Militant Behavior"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Uniformity, however much it may be a part of party propaganda, creates a clear image of serving (rather than belonging to) a certain political option.*

We cannot forget the night of 19 October when, after the meeting held by the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party, which, having proclaimed that the elections were a falsification committed by the state and declaring a boycott of the second round, some 5,000 to 6,000 people assembled in front of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Assembly. To many among them this was a night for tempting the peace and security of the state, for it was an open clash between a certain segment of citizens and members of the special MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] detachments in charge of protecting the Assembly. The most aggressive and "most eager" for a confrontation with the police, among these citizens, were several hundred young people recognized by their red berets bearing the insignia of a yellow lion, the symbol of the VMRO-DPMNE.

An Ordinary Parade or...

Red berets could be found also during the day of the second electoral round in Lisice Village, in the course of an incident with the police, when it was noted that their militant arsenal had been increased with the possession of firearms. They could also be found on the square, where a parallel vote was taking place as an intrinsic part of the VMRO-DPMNE decor, acting as organizers of all meetings held by that party. Briefly stated, within a short time the red berets became a specific previously unseen phenomenon on the Macedonian pluralistic skies, added to the green shirts and camouflage jackets, indicating the obvious existence of an organized militant segment consisting of young people. This is a rather open manifestation of initial similarities with the "Hitler Jugend," Mussolini's "Black Shirts," Bulgarian "Brannik," or the former Serbian "Sokoli."

The story of the red berets may also imply a different meaning. Returning on the night of 19 October in front of the Macedonian parliament, it was precisely they, as guardians of the peace for the VMRO-DPMNE, who must be credited with avoiding the outbreak of an incident between the angry crowd and the police forces. It was precisely the boys with the red berets who were able to keep the peace at the VMRO-DPMNE meeting in Kumanovo, erecting a living wall between the party sympathizers and a group of provocateurs. Therefore, this indicates a double role played by the red berets: On the one hand, we view them as disrupters of the public order, as militants and destructive people, and, on the other, as guardians of the order or as disciplined party activists.

Hence the dilemma of whether it is a question of an organized militant-political group (a kind of parallel party militia) or something much more innocent and safe. It is a fact that similar examples involving the red berets may be seen also in the sports stadiums (mainly the Vardar promoters of self-styled "liberation fighters") and throughout the city, in favorite youth gathering spots. The VMRO-DPMNE constantly insists that it has the largest number of young people. The VMRO-DPMNE so-called youth union numbers some 15,000 members, a number of which no other party could boast. Without checking the accuracy as to this number of young members claimed by that party, the impression remains that they are the most numerous and loudest protagonists of meetings within the VMRO-DPMNE organization, and that they include the most questionable and most aggressive group. A much more extensive and expert sociopsychological study would provide an answer to the question of what, how, and why have we reached such a level of self-identification that includes such a high percentage of young Macedonians with the VMRO-DPMNE. Shall we merely comment that the leadership of that party is successfully manipulating the national feelings of the young to whom extreme sensitivity and an impulsive temperament are inherent? Are we witnessing a classical type of political abuse of minors, something that is forbidden by law, or is it a question of yet something else?

Another question is whether indeed we are dealing with "our street bullies" who can vent their frustrated and destructive ideas precisely through the VMRO-DPMNE. In that case, it would be inevitable to consider the reality, the conclusion that we are dealing with a parallel world of the dark forces of chaos, showing its hooliganistic face on squares and streets, and which can be equally dangerous and destructive. In that context, it is quite important to understand the "red beret" phenomenon, ranging from organized recruiting of paramilitary formations, on the one hand, and classical novelty, on the other.

Political Counterculture

It is claimed at VMRO-DPMNE headquarters that the red berets are their creation, their propaganda material. According to our information, it is a question of some 2,000 berets, bought secondhand from Germany and, subsequently, issued free of charge to the most active

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members of the party in the various townships. They categorically reject any tendency toward setting up a militaristic organization of their members, claiming that it is strictly an attempt at promoting party propaganda. Actually, according to the VMRO-DPMNE, such hats were distributed by the Union for Macedonia as well.

However much we may believe in the propaganda nature of the red berets bearing the yellow lion insignia, the impression remains that they, with their military jackets, beards, long hair, and chauvinistic slogans, are an inevitable nationalistic decor appearing on the Macedonian pluralistic page. Hence the unpleasant feeling that we are dealing with a (more or less) spontaneous combination of what is described as a militaristic fashion and a militant attitude, adopted in specific political situations.

Anything else is of secondary nature and has no foundation. For example, some 15 years ago the main fashion hit was that of the "Vietnam" or U.S. military insignia worn on khaki shirts, "Yankee" hats, or combat boots. This time the situation is quite different and far less naive than the simple interpretation of the fact that the young have a natural affinity for military clothing. Conversely, it is a question of casting a different look at the situation, for uniformity, however much it may be a part of some kind of party propaganda, is already developing a transparent similarity with serving (rather than affiliation) a political option. If we know that that same option, on the political level, is brimming with exclusivity or with a black-and-white view on things, and that many of its aspects are related to unrealistic and unobjective solutions, the very fact of affiliation or obedience justifies the suspicion that the matter of the red berets is not all that naive.

Description of Elite Military Unit

95BA0049B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 5-6 Nov 94 pp 12-13

[Article by Brogomil D. Konstantinov: "Specially Forged Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Recently, at the protest meeting of the opposition in Skopje, the Guard, as an elite military unit, was assigned the task of strengthened security in the work premises of the president of the republic, who is also the supreme commander of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia].*

Our Guard, like all such units throughout the world, has its special uniform and reflects Macedonian traditions.

The special criteria applied in the choice of members of the Guard—the best physically and intellectually—are consistent with the privileges and duties of Guard members.

As an elite fighting unit, recently the Guard's function was to ensure the security of the Office of the President, in accordance with its own constitutional task, and during the protest meetings in Skopje. This triggered particular attention and interest. The answer to most questions of what it is, what type of unit, who is in it, and so forth, may be sought by looking at this military elite itself and in the course of discussions with the most responsible senior officers. Our interlocutor was the head of the Guard unit, its commander, Col. Djordji Djurovski.

The Guard unit of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia [ARM] is a new development in the armed forces of our state. It is an elite unit formed in April 1992, when the training of the first members of the Guard was undertaken. Two years later, this past April, for the first time in the history of Macedonia, this Guard unit of the ARM, in its Guard uniform, was deployed at the Skopje airfield, in the send-off ceremony of President Kiro Gligorov on his official visit to neighboring Bulgaria.

The regulation on the special use of the Guard as a military elite may be issued only by the president of the state, who is also the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia. According to Col. Djurovski, the ARM Guard consists of selected officers and soldiers. They follow the traditions of the soldiers of the first Macedonian-Kosovo National Liberation and the First Proletarian Macedonian National Liberation Shock Brigade.

In its present function, for the first time, the Guard showed up in the middle of the 15th century in France. By the end of the 19th century, the National Guard had 16 legions (60 battalions). A division of guards was set up in Great Britain in 1915. The National Guard of the United States accounts for a significant share of its land forces and, in addition to protecting the land from invasion, is in charge of maintaining order and security should trouble break out.

A Military Elite With Defined Assignments

Current military glossaries and encyclopedias describe the guard as follows: "The guard is a specially selected, equipped, and trained unit in charge of the personal security of the head of state and ensuring the security of the highest state and military institutions and personalities. The strength, composition, equipment, armament, and status of the personnel and the tasks they perform vary from country to country."

According to Col. Djordji Djurovski, our Guard, like the other guards throughout the world, has its own special uniform. Its wears a camouflage uniform and has a distinct parade dress uniform. An honor guard, for the guard of the head of state, or guarding the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the ARM, or other objects and individuals, is a privilege as well as a duty of its members. In addition to its commander, Djurovski, special contribution has been made in shaping the unit by senior Guard officers Jovan Kostadinov, Kiril Trampevski, Ljupco Todorovski, Branko Vezenkovski, and Goranco Koteski.

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To be a member of the Guard means to be part of the best of the elite. The choice of personnel begins at the recruitment. The criteria for guard service are very strict. In addition to an overall psychophysical training, those selected must be between 178 and 185 centimeters tall, not a centimeter higher or lower. Let us mention among the other characteristics discipline, patience, endurance, character stability, and patriotism.

From its very first honorable step, the Guard of the Republic of Macedonia has become the pride of our troops. The military elite undergoes special training. According to Commandant Djurovski, the training of the Guard involves a number of specific items but essentially is no different from that of the other arms. After a four-month training period, and based on their grades, the best of the entire group are chosen. The troops engage regularly in sports and maintain their required condition.

Troops With National Identification

The parade uniform of the Guard can be distinguished on the basis of its national identification. The Macedonian specifics set this unit apart from the others not only within its own Army but also among the other guard forces throughout the world. It took two years from the formation of the Guard before the uniform, as it is now, was designed. The current uniform was designed by Professor Dr. Djordji Zdravev, who is a noted expert in uniforms and a teacher, along with designer Dinko Krstevski.

The uniform of the Guard is a stylized combination of the one worn by the independence fighters of the Ilinden period and other military uniforms in Europe. In addition to the insignia and the tunic of liberation fighters, the uniform includes several specific features and an insignia. The guardsmen wear red scarfs around their necks and special boots resembling moccasins. In any case, the uniform of the ARM Guard is original in terms of aesthetics and the color of the tunic, the trousers, and the cloak.

The experience of a number of guard units in the rest of the world has been applied in the training and establishment of the ARM Guard. However, all these have been adapted to our conditions. The Army of the Republic of Macedonia is indeed young, only starting its third year, as is the Guard. However, it is based on deep roots dating from the revolutionary and liberation movements of the past, through the national liberation struggle, Ilinden, and before it.

The elite units are considered such not only because of the selection of the personnel, better armaments, equipment, and training, but also the tasks to which they are assigned and which are, as a rule, the more difficult.

[Box, p 12]

The Guard in the Past

As a separate military formation for the personal protection of rulers and military leaders, the guard appeared in the ancient world. For purposes of illustration, the Persian royal guard consisted of 2,000 horsemen and foot soldiers, whereas in Sparta the defense of the king was entrusted to specially selected strong men, out of whom, separately, a unit of 600 soldiers was formed.

The Roman military leaders used for security purposes cohort units (of 1,000 troops), while Octavian Augustus and his state were protected by nine cohorts, consisting of praetorians and paladins. What Persia called the "immortals" were known in Rome as the grenadiers.

[Box, p 13]

Revolutionary Traditions

The ARM Guard unit is billeted in the Ilinden barracks in Skopje. On Friday, 11 November, it will hold a military parade at 1030 hours, celebrating the 54th anniversary of the formation of the First Macedonian-Kosovo National Liberation Brigade. At the parade, preceding the Guard, will march the surviving members of the famous partisan brigade.

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Thaler Hints at Better Relations With Italy

AU2401162195 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovenia and Italy have a serious opportunity to change the tide in bilateral relations in a positive direction at the beginning of this year because Italy has a new government and because there will be some changes in the Slovene Government, too. This is what a candidate for foreign minister Zoran Thaler said at the news conference by the representatives of the Slovene minority in Italy in the Slovene Parliament today.

According to him, increasingly more people on the Italian side also realize that the relations between the countries were not at their best in the past year. According to Zoran Thaler, a recent visit by Gian Giacomo Migone, chairman of the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs' Committee, to Ljubljana was important for the improvement of relations, because it facilitated an indirect contact with the new Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli.

In an interview for IL MESSAGGERO, the new Italian foreign minister, among other things, also spoke about ways in which she intends to resolve open issues between Italy and Slovenia. She emphasized that Rome is now awaiting the constitution of the new government in Ljubljana, that is, the appointment of the foreign minister, in order to resume negotiations on real estate of the Italian option takers [optanti]. Few Italian media wrote about the announced changes in the Slovene Government. The ANSA news agency published a report from yesterday's news conference by Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek while LA REPUBBLICA wrote that the candidate for the new Slovene foreign minister is a tough negotiator who is perceived as a hawk in Ljubljana. Even as the chairman of the parliamentary commission for international relations, Thaler was unyielding on the issue of real estate of the Italian option seekers, LA REPUBBLICA writes.

Peterle Doubts About Coalition Agreement Annex

AU2501164595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] met at a constituent session yesterday afternoon, elected the council's deputy chairman, and discussed the executive committee's report on party work in the period from the 3d party congress to the present. The council members devoted the greatest attention to a debate and conclusions pertaining to the implementation of the government coalition agreement, as well as proposals about future relations within the coalition.

They spoke critically of a conflict that has emerged because the council of the Liberal Democracy [LDS] did not organize a debate with the SKD council about an annex to the coalition agreement. After the session, Party President Peterle told Milan Trobic the following:

[Begin Peterle recording] Our intention was to discuss the matter simultaneously in parties' councils. The annex as it stands is not balanced, I believe, bearing in mind the relations. It also does not define fundamental program directives that have been discussed so far. This primarily refers to an agreement that we will not change the Law on Denationalization and that we will jointly bring about the passing of a law on compensation of injustices before the big celebrations in May this year. Also, it is not specified that we will clearly pursue a policy of good neighboring relations and integration of Slovenia in the European Union and that we need a stance regarding the family policy, as well as some definitions regarding economic and social policy and also regarding education legislation. These are, therefore, very fundamental definitions as to what we wish to accomplish in these realms. Following this, there should be another month of time for a more detailed preparation of the program bases, that is, any additions.

We expect that once these definitions exist, which our council and our side had demanded earlier because the whole process does not merely involve the swap of departments, but also program directives, the council will also then pass them. [end recording]

LDS: Demands 'Unacceptable'

AU2501172295 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The council of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] met this afternoon to discuss the annex to the coalition agreement. Before the meeting, the LDS caucus concluded that the council of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] had in fact rejected an annex to the coalition agreement last night by putting forward demands according to which Janko Dezelak, as a candidate for the minister for economic relations and development, would not merely be deputy prime minister but also a coordinator of the economic ministries and would, as a new minister, be able to replace one of the three state secretaries. On top of this, the SKD would also get a state secretary in the Education Ministry, while Lojze Peterle would become the president of the parliamentary commission for international relations. These demands are unacceptable to the LDS.

According to some indications, Prime Minister Drnovsek might withdraw Dezelak's ministerial nomination today.

After the session, Milan Trobic interviewed Dimitrij Rupel, president of LDS Council:

[Begin recording] [Trobic] The LDS council, at today's session, which ended more than an hour ago, discussed the annex to the coalition agreement, a letter by the SKD council, and a letter by Janez Kocjancic, president of the United List of the Social Democrats to Dr. Janez

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Drnovsek. We asked Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, president of the LDS council, for a brief commentary:

[Rupel] Regarding the first text, we assessed and voted that it is a befitting result of the negotiations between the LDS and the SKD. We, therefore, perceive it as something that the party can agree to.

Regarding the letter of the SKD council, we did not make any decisions, however, the debate on it was rather lively. During the debate, we raised numerous critical objections to this letter, however, we neither passed nor rejected it, because it is not written in a form that would merit such treatment. The members of our council believe that this letter contains issues on which an agreement has already been reached and that it means returning to an earlier phase of negotiations, which is unacceptable to us. This especially refers to certain program matters, such as education legislation, a post of state secretary in the Ministry for Education and Sport, and so forth.

Regarding the third text, we have accepted it, or to put it differently, we have accepted the initiative given by the United List to hold negotiations on a triple coalition. We embraced the initiative to negotiate with the United List on program issues, among which are issues very similar to those put forward by the SKD. We agreed to discuss this trilaterally, if possible, and if the SKD agrees to it. You know that, even so far, the LDS has been favorably inclined to such and similar initiatives and that we are in favor of a triple coalition, however, the SKD has opposed this so far.

United List Backs Continued Joint Coalition

AU2501180995 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It seemed that the proposed swap of the Ministry for Economic Relations and Development and the Foreign Ministry between the Christian Democrats [SKD] and the Liberal Democrats [LDS] had been coordinated with the third party of the coalition—the United List. However, the political directorate of the United List, in a letter to Prime Minister Drnovsek, now demands a tripartite coalition agreement, that is, an equal status of this party in the coalition.

The representatives of the United List explained their demands at a news conference. Alenka Terlep reports:

[Begin recording] [Terlep] It is right that the grand coalition continues functioning, if possible, until the regular elections. However, the cadre permutations between the two coalition partners alone are not sufficient, the United List maintains, alleging that it is interested in reaching a consensus on contextual matters and program. These are: The conditions for economic development, increased employment, school reform, compensation of war injustices, however, in a manner that would not devalue the national liberation struggle [during World War II], and similar. Janez Kocjancic, thus, says:

[Kocjancic] Certain cadre agreements as a solution to a serious coalition crisis are too shallow a result for us to accept. Our attitude toward the coalition and the work within the coalition is not so shallow, and we are not a party that is waiting on the sidelines in order to gain something extra, we are a party that is interested in most of its political program being contained in the coalition agreement and this agreement being realized.

[Terlep] The United List expects Drnovsek's reply to a question of whether joint talks of all three parties on a new coalition agreement will begin before the vote tomorrow, otherwise, Kocjancic says:

[Kocjancic] If we do not get a principled answer, we will not support the candidates for ministers. If, within a jointly agreed time period, which would be relatively short and limited, we do not reach a joint agreement on the coalition program, then we will leave the coalition.

[Terlep] Janez Kocjancic also said that the party is interested in participating in the coalition, however, only if all three partners are equal:

[Kocjancic] If we are not capable of reaching an agreement on the coalition, then we will not take part in it. Believe me, the United List is not waving a water pistol.

SDSS Leader Says Coalition 'Falling Apart'

AU2501191895 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As Robert Skerjanc reports from his news conference, Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party [SDSS], assessing the current coalition disputes, said that regardless of the outcome of the coalition negotiations, something that is falling apart at the seams will merely be patched up temporarily and the coalition will continue to disintegrate. Regarding the latest move of the United List, Jansa said:

[Begin Jansa recording] In reality, the United List does not merely have an equal status, but has recently enjoyed a slightly better status in this coalition, however, for the sake of the party's image they would now like a legally and formally equal coalition agreement. Whether they will succeed or not primarily depends on those who are making this coalition behind the scenes.

If you watched President Kucan's speech on television on Monday [23 January]—I did not, I merely heard about it from others—then no additional explanation is needed as to where the architects of this so-called grand coalition are. [end recording]

Regarding the new foreign minister candidate, Zoran Thaler, Jansa believes it is evident that, by such a cadre policy, Prime Minister Drnovsek is trying to secure himself a powerful influence over foreign policy.

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Regarding Janko Dezelak, candidate for minister for economic relations and development, he said that he will not be able to implement any essential changes in this ministry and will most probably be as prominent as hitherto Minister Kracun has been. [passage omitted]

Drnovsek: Minister Nominations Remain 'Unchanged'

AU2601082595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek spoke about the latest changes in the government and relations among the coalition parties on the Studio at 1700 radio program today. Among other things, he was asked whether his nomination of two ministers would remain unchanged in light of a current rumors that Janko Dezelak might step down from his candidacy. Niko Robavs prepared a short summary of the interview:

[Begin recording] The nominations of candidates for the new foreign minister and minister for economic relations and development, Zoran Thaler and Janko Dezelak respectively, remains unchanged and the State Assembly will debate this at an extraordinary session tomorrow. Dr. Drnovsek expects that deputies will support both candidacies and that all coalition parties will vote in favor of them.

Regarding the latest United List demand to become an equal coalition member, the prime minister said he agreed with the signing of an equal coalition agreement and added that Janez Kocjancic [head of the United List] and Lojze Peterle [head of the Christian Democrats] had already discussed this.

Janez Drnovsek dismissed criticism about unsuccessful foreign policy over the past three months, when he performed the role of foreign minister. He stressed that foreign policy was successful. Europe now understands the conflict between Slovenia and Italy better, and our state has also won the support of numerous European countries. The government will pursue a decisive and principled policy toward neighboring countries even in the future. A new round of talks also started with Croatia. Contacts of incumbent ministries and commissions are already scheduled.

Regarding the possible relocation of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] headquarters to Slovenia, Dr. Drnovsek said that we had received no such official proposal and that he was opposed to this as it would again bring us into the proximity of the war in the Balkans.

He also spoke about the payment of former joint SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] debts to commercial banks and said that a new agreement should be signed and relations clarified as, otherwise, Slovenia could be forced to also pay the debts of other former Yugoslav republics. [end recording]

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Federal

Envoy: FRY Successor to Former Federation

LD2501231995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2242 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador to the United Nations Dragomir Djokic said Wednesday that under international law, Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY] was the legal successor to the former six-member Yugoslav Federation.

Djokic said in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali that Yugoslavia was the owner of the former Federation's property until the final division of assets and liabilities had been made.

He described as untenable claims by the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that Yugoslavia was just one of five successors to the former Federation.

Djokic said that this was so because the republics had seceded but the Federation had not ceased to exist.

Four former Yugoslav republics in December called on the U.N. secretary-general to block Yugoslavia's request for defreezing part of the funds in foreign banks, so that it could settle about 11 million dollars of debt to the United Nations.

Djokic said that Yugoslavia did not lay claim to all assets and liabilities of the former Federation, which is being discussed by a special working group for succession within the international conference on the former Yugoslavia.

Djokic said that there was no doubt, however, that a considerable part of the funds frozen under the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia belonged to companies and banks in Yugoslavia, which is not being discussed within the final division of assets and liabilities and there was therefore no reason why they should remain blocked.

Djokic in October 1994 submitted a demand to the U.N. Security Council to unblock part of the funds, but the council has so far failed to include the issue in its agenda, although the funds were meant for settling the outstanding debt to the United Nations.

Yugoslav Red Cross: Serbs Receive Less Aid

LD2501205895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1936 GMT 25 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Red Cross said Wednesday that international humanitarian organizations were continuing sending less aid to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

The Yugoslav Red Cross said relief aid was being reduced despite the huge needs of the populations of the Bosnian Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina.

A meeting of the secretaries of the Yugoslav Red Cross, the republican and regional secretaries of the Bosnian Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, advised the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs to step up activities to inform the international public and potential donors about their needs.

The Yugoslav Red Cross relief aid program, which only partially covers the needs of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, was fully realized in 1994. In the period of Aug. 4 until the end of 1994, private donors secured 3,500 shipments for the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, the meeting said.

The Bosnian Serb republic was formed by the local Serbs in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991 after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Serbia

PM Urges Lifting of Sanctions, Commitment to Peace

AU2501160095 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] There is not a single political, moral, or other reason that justifies the further maintenance of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said at the traditional January reception for representatives of the diplomatic and military corps in Belgrade. Radovan Pantovic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Pantovic] One of the enduring characteristics of Yugoslav foreign policy is its support for peace, and no one in the past year expressed as consistently as we did our commitment to peace, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said addressing the foreign diplomatic representatives in the Palace of the Federation. Yugoslavia has opted for the Contact Group plan because it represents a realistic basis for resuming the peace process. It also supports the four-month ceasefire in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and hopes the period will be used for developing the peace process. The Croatian president's demand for the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] withdrawal reflects the forces that favor war. Prime Minister Kontic believes that the dialogue between Zagreb and Knin should be continued, and the Vance-Owen plan should serve as a basis for negotiations. In this sense, the reestablishment of economic ties should be supported because a stable and lasting solution can only be found gradually.

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[Kontic] As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, it has no territorial aspirations toward any of the former republics, and it will support any agreement reached between the warring sides in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

We are also interested in developing cooperation with the former Yugoslav republics, but this is contingent on first solving the open issues that arose after the secession. One of the enduring characteristics of our policy is our insistence on continuity with the earlier Yugoslavia. That is why recognition for us, as the previous country, and for the former Yugoslav republics cannot be of the same significance. That is why we are ready to negotiate the recognition of these former Yugoslav republics as states once the existing political problems are solved.

Yugoslavia also supports the development of bilateral cooperation with all countries. Of course, this is contingent on equal conditions and mutual respect. We would be grateful if you would convey our readiness to develop bilateral cooperation to your governments and the organizations you represent.

[Pantovic] Prime Minister Kontic also stressed that there was not a single reason for maintaining the sanctions against Yugoslavia and that the policy of blockade and pressure has proved to be completely unproductive. That is why the UN Security Council should be consistent and soon make the decision to lift the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Montenegro

Djukanovic: Economic Program Restores Confidence

LD2501155895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1431 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Premier Milo Djukanovic has said that the Yugoslav economic recovery program has produced good results, restored the peace of mind and confidence in the state.

Djukanovic said on Montenegrin TV late Tuesday that, since inaugurated a year ago, the program had produced extremely good results in the national economy's recovery, especially in terms of industrial production and the stability of the national currency, the dinar.

The program of monetary restructuring and economic recovery has been implemented in the conditions of the country's total international economic blockade. Thanks to the program, industrial production in Yugoslavia was 1.2 percent higher in 1994 than the previous year.

Djukanovic said Montenegro had set itself realistic goals for 1995, too. He said it would be possible to implement most of the Federal Government's economic policy as it was now. The policy includes a package of short-term measures aimed at securing a good start.

The Montenegrin premier said his Republic planned that industrial production increase 4.8 percent and the social product 6 percent this year.

Kosovo

PDP Briefs Rugova on FYROM Albanians

AU2501143295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, today received a delegation of one wing of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] composed of Abdurrahman Aliti, chairman; Xhemal Hajdari, deputy chairman; Ilir Luma, presidency member; and Ismet Ramadani, coordinator of the PDP parliamentary group in the Macedonian parliament.

The PDP leaders briefed President Rugova on the current political trends in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] and party efforts to resolve problems of Albanians living there. They talked about the cooperation of Albanian political parties in Macedonia and need for a common action and understanding by the political parties and institutions in the Albanian world.

The Kosova Information Center reports that during the conversation, they stressed the need for better activation of the Coordinating Council of Albanian Political Parties in former Yugoslavia.

Latest Serb Program for Kosovo 'Colonization'

AU2501131395 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 537 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian government will very soon pass a new programme on Kosova, a Serbian government minister, Vekoslav Sosevic, has recently told Radio Kragujevac (Serbia), today's BUJKU reports.

According to Mr. Sosevic, the main objectives of the programme will be "a better functioning of the rule of law, and the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosova." In this respect, out of a nine-million-dinar fund dedicated to the construction of settlements for refugees in Serbia most of it will be spent in Kosova, he said. "All ministries in the Serbian government are obliged to submit urgent projects for specific issues in Kosova," Sosevic said.

The Serbian regime has been widely drumming up and performing schemes for the colonization of Kosova and changing its ethnic composition. Only recently, the government of the self-styled Yugoslavia has passed a statutory decree "for the realization of programme for the

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settlement of 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova." The programme envisages to provide long-term loans and plots of land to those Serbs who want to settle in Kosova.

Over the past couple of years several settlements for Serb colonizers have either been constructed or are under construction in many places in Kosova.

Today's Prishtina-based Serbian daily JEDINSTVO reported that the Serbian-installed administration of Prizren has recently "bought" some 40 apartments which will be granted to those Serbs who wish to come and live in Kosova. The Serbia-installed chairman of the municipal assembly in Prizren, Dimitrije Misic, is quoted by the newspaper as saying that out of 180,000 inhabitants of the Prizren district only 11,000 are Serbs and Montenegrins. The Serbian regime envisages to erect a settlement for Serbs in an Albanian-inhabited village Dushanova, as the Albanian border is only 15 km far from Prizren and there is not a single Serb village in that zone, Mr. Misic told the newspaper. In addition, he said, the Serb families who are to settle in that settlement will be granted three hectares of fertile land each.

Kosumi Views 'Institutionalization' Plans

AU2501131495 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 537 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Convening of the Parliament of the Republic of Kosova is an essential issue. It would bring about a quality upgrading and a promoting the internal organization in our movement," Mr. Bajram Kosumi, chairman of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK), said in an interview to the Albanian Section of the Deutsche Welle radio broadcasting.

Pressing for further institutionalization, Mr. Kosumi said that "a government in exile may never be as successful as needed," and called for "the completion of the (Kosova) government with new ministers and departments."

Asked whether he believed in the influence of the international community on the solution of the Kosova issue, Mr. Kosumi said: "The international community does not understand thoroughly the Kosova issue, suggesting solutions which are not in accord with political will of Albanians, expressed in referendum. We believe that the international community wants to see that a war in Kosova does not erupt, and, for the sake of its internal relations, it is interested in finding easy, but not just, solutions."

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